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London Legal Letter. list. He sits daily from eleven until his work is concluded, hearing first ex parie applica tions, then matters in which counsel appear, and later on those attended only by solicitors. The practice is simple and business-like. An officer guards the door and allows in the room only those whose application is being heard and those in the following case. The judge without vestments sits behind an office table, in front of which are grouped the parties, standing. The matter is stated concisely, and " prejudice " and irrelevant talk is not encouraged. In this way a " strong " judge is able to get through a mass of work in a short space of time. The appeal from the 4 master to the judge in chambers must be brought within five days, and if the appellant is not satisfied with the' ruling of the judge he may appeal to the Appeal Court, but must file his appeal within eight clays. This prac tice not only insures a speedy determina tion of the matter but provides a way in which an appeal may be heard in interlocutory mat ters. To illustrate the working of the practice I may mention a recent action in which the writ was served within the past three or four weeks, and in which final judgment has already been signed against the defendant. The action was brought by an insolvent American national bank and its receivers to recover $3,000 from a shareholder resi dent in England on her double liability under the statute. The endorsement upon the writ was in these terms : " The plaintiff's claim is for an assessment on shares due from the de fendant as a holder of shares in the plaintiff company and interest thereon. Particulars : To assessment of $ i oo a share made on March 1 4, 1899, by the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States of America as prescribed by sections 5 1 5 1 and 5 2 34 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, payable this day on 30 shares of stock in the capital of the plaintiff bank standing in the name of the defendant, $3,000, or £614. os. ¿,d. This is all the pleading there was in this

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action for $3,000. The moment the defend ant entered an appearance the plaintiff served her with notice of his intention to apply for leave to sign judgment under "Order 14," the claim being for a liquidated amount. In support of his claim the plaintiff filed the usual affidavit alleging that the defendant had no defence to the merits. The defend ant set up in her affidavit that she was a British subject, that she bought the shares in England, that they were fully paid, that she did not know of the existence of the Stat utes of the United States, that they had no extra-territorial effect, and that if these for eign statutes imposed any liability upon her in the way of an implied contract she was entitled to defend in order to ascertain the nature of that liability. The master, after hearing counsel, made an order granting the plaintiff leave to sign judgment unless the defendant paid the £614 into court. The defendant appealed and the appeal was heard before the judge in chambers four days later. The judge declined to interfere with the order, holding that the defendant by taking shares in a foreign bank had impliedly con tracted to be bound by the statutes or laws under which the bank was organized. It was urged, but in vain, that there was no proof of the terms of the statute, or that the bank was insolvent, or that the plaintiff had in fact been appointed its receiver, or that the Comptroller of the Currency had made any assessment upon the shareholders, or of the amount of such assessment, if any. The judge merely answered that the affidavit im plied that the statute authorized the assess ment, and that the necessary steps to enforce it had been taken, but if counsel for the de fendant would say that he had any reason to believe that there was any irregularity in connection with the action of the Comptroller of the Currency or of the receiver, he would allow the defendant to defend. Counsel could not in conscience say this, and so the judgment was entered. Such certainty in deciding cases of so much importance is cal