tion against the United States, for such loss exists in favor of either citizen or alien resi dent; that no national liability is incurred by the United States; that the United States is not responsible to its own citizens for the injury or destruction of their property caused by its military operations. See U. S. v. Pa cific Railroad Co., (120 U. S. Rep. page 227) in which the court referring to the late Civil War uses the following language, " The war, whether considered with reference to the number of troops in the field, the extent of military operations, and the number and character of the engagements, attained pro portions unequalled in the history of the pre sent century. More than a million of men were in the armies on either side. The in jury and destruction of private property caused by their operations, and by measures necessary for their safety and efficiency were almost beyond calculation. For all injuries and destruction which followed necessarily from these causes no compensation could be claimed from the government. By the wellsettled doctrine of public law it was not re sponsible for them. The destruction or in jury of private property in battle, or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways, in the war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences. Whatever would cmbarass or impede the enemy, as the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple or defeat him, as destroying his means' of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the commanding general. Indeed it was his im perative duty to direct their destruction. The necessities of war called for and justified this. The safety of the State in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss. Sains populi is then, in truth, suprema lex." To sustain its position, the court refers to three cases, in which relief was sought through congressional action, one occurring in the Revolutionary Var, one in the war of 1812, and the other during the late Civil War. Each of these cases presented a strong
equity in favor of the claimant. In the ear liest case, that of Mr. Frothingham, the peti tioner asked compensation for the loss of a dwelling-house belonging to his mother, sit uated in the city of Charleston, which was burned by order of General Sullivan, as a matter of military necessity. The committee appointed by Congress to investigate the claim reported adversely, and no further action was had in the matter. A similar re port was made by a congressional committee appointed by the I7th Congress appointed to investigate and report upon the claim of a Mr. Villiars of Louisiana, for damages sus tained by his plantation, by reason of cutting through a levee in its vicinity. The act com plained of was done by order of General Morgan, commanding the Louisiana militia, to prevent the British invader from bringing his cannon to the city of New Orleans. The third claim was by one J. Milton Best, for the value of a dwelling-house situated in Paducah, Kentucky, destroyed by order of the commanding officer of the Union forces, under urgent military necessity. The claim ant was a man of undoubted loyalty, who had rendered valuable service to the Union cause. The bill for the relief of Mr. Best passed Congress, but was vetoed by President Grant. In his message to the Senate the president, after speaking of the claim as one for com pensation, on account of the ravages of war, and observing that its payment would invite the presentation of demands for very large sums of money against the government for necessary perty by and the unavoidable army, said : destruction "It is a general of piv> principle of both international and municipal law that all property is held subject not only to be taken by the government for public uses (in which case, under the constitution of the United States, the owner is entitled to just rarily compensation), occupied, but or also evensubject actually to destroyed, be tempo in times of great public danger, and when the public safety demands it; and in this latter case governments do not admit a legal
