icated as not to be able to find his key would be disgraceful. It might not have been so bad if he had only lost the keyhole, but to lose both the key and keyhole would be such a paralyzing drunk as would be both scandal ous and slanderous to speak of if false. An interesting case grew out of an alleged slander in which the defamatory words were that " boots had been stolen from a dead body washed ashore from a wreck." If the boots had been washed ashore they would have been derelict and belong to the finder. But it was not the boots that were washed ashore, it was their dead owner who was beyond dis puting their ownership. The court reasoned the matter not that the boots were not der elict and had not been voluntarily abandoned by the owner. It was true that he was washed ashore, but he brought his boots along, and being attached to the body they were his property at the time of his decease. Hence to steal boots being the property of another, even though that other was a dead body washed ashore, was to impute a felony and the words were actionable per sc. Words not actionable in themselves become so when spoken of a person in his trade or profession. To say of a weaver, " he pawneth the goods of his customers and is not to be trusted," of a maltster, " he is a cheating knave and keeps a false book," of a black smith " he keeps false books and I can prove it," of a drover who purchases cattle and drives them to market, that " he is bankrupt and is not able to pay his just debts," have all been held actionable in themselves without proof of special damage. It is possible to slander a man not by charging that he committed a criminal offense for which he may be indicted and punished, but that he has already been punished for such offense. Hence words charging one falsely with having been a convict in the penitentiary of a sister state are actionable per se. It was adjudged in another case that words falsely spoken of a person imputing a crimi
nal offense, for which the party if the charge is true may be indicted and punished are actionable in themselves even though the proof is complete that the offense could never have happened. Words, "you have killed А. В., you have poisoned him and I can prove it," were actionable even though A. B. was never poisoned, even though he was alive as he could be, in a distant part of the country. A nice illustration, by the way, that false words must be the foundation of a slander. It makes no difference what the facts are in connection with the subject spoken of, provided the words be false. Some people use the most extravagant language about nothing and exhaust them selves and their tempers in Billingsgate, but not every one that so murders the Queen's English will be adjudged a slander per se in the eyes of the law. In one case when it was said of J. K., " He is a damned rascal as ever lived, and all who joined his party in the procession on the Fourth of July are a set of black hearted highwaymen, robbers and murderers," it was shown that these words were used about a fuss over a bass viol in which a man had been stabbed and they were held not to be actionable. It was only one of those awful fusses that are indigenous to choirs. It would be well for one about to slander, to stop, think, consider. Then if you must commit the tort, there is no escape from it, go into a corner with yourself and commit the tort upon the empty air. Do not per mit any one to hear the slander you utter but yourself. Then you can have all the satis faction of having spoken a slander but will not run the legal risk of having to answer in damages for the same. Is it possible for a slander to give any other satisfaction to the one uttering the same than that of having heard oneself talk? To make a slander technically legal, depends upon the audience. If it is to yourself, no publication results. If to another, there is a publication, for the essence of the tort is starting it on its circu
