example of the lengths to which courts of justice "may be led if they allow themselves in the pursuit of perfectly complete reme dies for all wrongful acts, to transgress the bounds which our law, in a wise con sciousness, as I conceive, of its limited
it for the juryman. Again, why draw the line between good and bad faith? If advice given mala fide and loss sustained entitle me to damages, why, though the advice be given honestly but under wrong information with a loss sustained, am I not entitled to them?"
MR. JUSTICE PATTESON.
powers, has imposed on itself of redressing only the proximate and direct consequences of wrongful acts. To draw a line between advice, persuasion, enticement and procure ment is practically impossible in a court of justice; who shall say how much of a free agent's resolution flows from the interfer ence of other minds, or the independent resolution of his own? This is a matter for the casuist rather than the jurist: still less is
The courts are still struggling with these questions. The work of the Court of Common Pleas was limited in amount during this period. Until 1841 it was a closed court, and only sergeants could argue cases there. It enjoyed the services, however, of some very able lawyers. Of its three chiefs, Tindal (1820)46), Wilde (1846-50) and Jervis (1850-56), Tindal and Jervis take high rank as magis
