that he sometimes "rose to sublime strains of eloquence: but their sublimity was alto gether in the sentiment; the diction retained its simplicity, and this increased the effect." It was in the comparatively untrodden do main of constitutional law, in bringing acts of the Legislature and of the executive to the test of the fundamental law of the Consti tution, that his judicial capacity was pre eminently shown. Deciding upon legal grounds, and only so much as was necessary for the disposition of the particular case, he constantly kept in mind the whole scheme of the Constitution. And he answered all possible objections with such fulness and such power as to make his conclusions ap pear natural and inevitable.1 The extraordinary influence of Marshall's judicial work is to be ascribed to his posses sion of reasoning powers of remarkable ca pacity, a character of unchallenged integrity, a moral courage which never quailed, and a devotion to the institutions of his country which animated every act of his official life. His impartiality was conceded by all. The processes of reasoning, through which, step by step, he reached a conclusion, were so ac curate in their logical sequence, that the in tellect could detect no flaw. He convinced the mind if he did not convert the heart. The arguments by which he supported a successful contention, were unanswerable. The opinions which prefaced his great judg ments were, to be sure, entitled to that re spect which due deference for the decisions of a judicial tribunal ought always to com mand. But his claims to the homage of a contemporary period and of posterity, rest upon other grounds than those of perfunc tory reverence for those in authority. Not one of those judgments was the mere if>sc divit of power. He silenced the voice of op posing contention by his almost supernatural faculty of establishing the correctness of his views with the clearness and certainty of mathematical demonstration. From premise to conclusion, the progress 1 Mr. Justice Gray.
of his logic was like the movement of the mighty river, gathering strength and vol ume in its ever broadening, ever deepening flow, until, at the last, it glides through the placid estuary into its appointed harbor. His immortal expositions of the Constitu tion are marked by a clearness of style which is unsurpassed. The mind follows easily the thread of his argument, even when dealing with the most complex or abstruse subject. A favorite expression was, " it is admitted." This provoked the remark: "Once admit his premises, and you are forced to his con clusion; therefore deny everything he says." And Daniel Webster said to Justice Story: "When Judge Marshall says, 'it is admitted,' sir, I am preparing for a bomb to burst over my head and demolish all my points."1 The opinions of Marshall are models of judicial style. No legal writings were ever freer from technicalities of language or thought. In plain words which reach even the unlearned understanding, without orna ment, and absolutely devoid of flourish or by-play or looking to side effects of any kind, they present a calm and steady flow of pure and sustained reason from postulate to con clusion. And they read to the lawyers of to-day as they read to the lawyers in the cases they decided, for the argument has no trace of personal, or party, or temporary considerations. Though his individual convictions were deep and strenuous and the contests of his time were fierce and unsparing, his person ality no more appears than the personality of Shakespeare in "Hamlet" or "Macbeth." He wrote as Shakepeare wrote, not in the taste or fashion of his age. but on the foundations of human wisdom in the light of pure and enduring reason. And he wrote as Thucydides wrote, not for a day, but as a possession for all time.2 To describe his reasoning, lawyers, judges, commentators and biographers have em 1 Honorable San ford B. I .add. 1 Mr. Justice Mitchell.
