A Century of English Judicature.
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and again in 1719, the Irish House of Lords Lord Hartford's guardianship of Lord Sey claimed jurisdiction; this claim was allowed mours daughter. But the theory of final decision by a com in 1783, but in 1800 it was finally taken away bination of lay and legal minds gradually by the act of union. Yet even late in the eighteenth century the broke down. Lay peers were, as a rule, House was only beginning to be regarded as little disposed to attend the hearing of purely a regular court of justice. Its composition private and technical cases; and they soon remained uncertain until it was finally set practically lost their right to sit even in cases tled by statute under the Judicature Act. of quasi-political and general public interest. The original conception doubtless implied The matter came to an issue in O'ConnelFs the judgment of the whole House assisted case, u Cl. F. 155, in 1844, when the lay by the advice of the assembled judges. Of peers, in deference to the Duke of Welling course the Lord Chancellor presided, and ton, finally waived their right to vote. The there were generally eminent lawyers among last occasion on which a lay peer voted was the peers who would presumably lead in the the case of Bradlaugh v. Clarke, 8 App. Cas. discussion. The reports of the judicial pro 354, when Lord Denman, son of Lord Chief ceedings of the House prior to the nine Justice Denman voted. Lord Denman had been educated for the bar, but he did not teenth century are so meagre that it is im possible to ascertain the character of their come within the recognized definition of a discussions. The earliest report of their law lord," i. e., one who had held high judicial proceedings by Shower (1694-1733) judicial office; yet the law officers of the gov —a brief report of about fifty cases confined ernment were of opinion that the vote was mainly to a statement of the issues and the lawful. The other component part of the com actual judgment of the House—was consid ered by the House an infringement of its position of the ancient tribunal, the assem privileges. The same meagreness character bled judges, has also practically disappeared. The right of the House of Lords to sum izes other reporters of the eighteenth cen mon the judges at the beginning of each tury: Colles (1697-1713) and Brown (con tinued by Tomlins) (1702-1800). Hall states Parliament to be present for the purpose of that in his day judgment was regularly given assisting the House, when required, in the by the majority of voices. In 1689 we find determination of legal questions, is of great the judgment below in the case of Titus antiquity. But, although the judges still re Oates affirmed by the vote of thirty-five to ceive this summons, they no longer attend twenty-three in opposition to the unanimous unless specially summoned for a particular opinion of the assembled judges. The purpose. It seems to have been a common judgment of the Queen's Bench in the practice of the House during the eighteenth celebrated case of Ashby г. White, i century to consult the judges; but the re Bro. P. C. 62, in 1703, was reversed ports of that time give simply their judg in the House by a general vote of ment. During the first quarter of the nine fifty to sixteen. Some of the other cases in teenth century Lord Chancellor Eldon and Lord Redesdale, who performed most of the which the lay peers participated were Doug las v. St. John (Lord's Journal, XXXII, judicial functions of the House, seldom called 264), in 1769: Alexander v. Montgomery for the views of the judges. During the pe (Lord's Journal, XXXIII, 519), in 1773; riod from the retirement of Lord Eldon to Hill v. St. John (Lord's Journal, XXXIV. the Judicature Act the judges were frequently 4431, in 1775: Bishop of London v. Fytche consulted, and almost all the advisory opin (Lord's Journal, XXXVI. 687), in 1783; and ions of the judges come within this period. as late as 1806 lay peers voted in the case of Since the Judicature Act the judges have
