Riot Law. RIOT
379
LAW.
BY JONATHAN TAYLOR, JR. THE punishment of a criminal is taken as a matter of course in our modern system of law and there follow from such punishments no outbursts of prejudice or passion. In even the best regulated com munities, one expects there will always be some degenerates, who ever need the strong hand of the law to force them to their proper place. The calm resignation with which the public mind greets the punishment of the urong-doer is one of the modern marvels. We expect larceny, burglary and murder to meet their adequate and just punishment. Our scheme of criminal justice is so well ordered that the punishment of criminals occurs with the greatest of regularity and precision, save in one or two notorious of fenses, for which the public mind entertains a lively increasing horror and dislike. The punishment for criminal assault and rape has met with startlingly little regular enforce ment save in older and more settled com munities. To insure the punishment of these crimes, men have called into opera tion "Lynch Law." By the use of this power they propose to right the wrongs of society and to relieve the constituted au thorities from their sworn and solemn duties. To discuss the means by which "Lynch Law is met and overcome, to investigate the exact legal status of such means, to de fine the application of these laws in a con crete instance, is the object of this paper. In the idea of self protection and preser vation, one finds the aim of "Lynch Law." Personal wrongs and grievances form a potent and ever present reminder of some injury inflicted and hence the eternal desire to right any fancied wrong. For example, a man may be fairly tolerant of any breach of contract and may not be particularly en raged over the loss of some chattel. Rut let one person strike another, and the instan
taneous tendency is to strike back; the in jury and the hurt are too recent and too present. Thus we see the germ of "Lynch Law." Then there is that ever present ten dency to enforce laws, because the proper authorities fail to do so. This is the ten dency against which all lawyers and rightminded citizens strive so earnestly. Recently, in Kansas, the efforts of Mrs. Nation have shown some startling evidences of this ten dency. Talk as one will, the desire for squar ing up all matters by one powerful stroke is eternal in the human heart. The consideration of certain recent legis lation in Ohio, and of the proceedings under it, may throw some light on the questions before us. Ohio, like most other States, has always had on her statute books a statute against ordinary riot, the usual disturbance caused by a tumult on public thoroughfares. But new conditions arose, and the need of more stringent legislation was felt. Two serious outbreaks occurred, one at Fairfax County, Washington С. Н., and the other at Urbana, Ohio. In both places an attempt was made to seize and capture a negro ravisher. To meet these conditions, in the year 1898, the following act was passed ^O. L., Vol. 92, p. 411): "That whoever shall break into, or attempt to break into, a jail or any prison, or attack an officer with the intent to seize a prisoner with the purpose of lynching, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall be confined in the penitentiary not more than ten years nor less than one year."
As will be seen from the language of the Statute, this act was aimed directly at any attempt to further mob violence. Being a recent act, no enforcement of it was possible until the riot at Akron, Ohio, occurred. Here the authorities had removed the pris oner from the jail early in the day. The
