the duty, for to lay a trap involves in ordinary language an intention, yet it is clear that the duty extends to a danger re sulting from negligence irrespective of inten tion. Though each of these circumstances covers the circumstances to which it is
propositions. That, in the present considera tion, is the same proposition which will cover the similar legal liability inferred in the cases of collision and carriage. The proposition which these recognized cases suggest, and which is therefore to be deduced from them,
TORD FSHER. particularly applied, it does not cover the other set of circumstances from which an exactly similar liability is inferred. It follows that there must be some larger proposition which involves and covers both sets of cir cumstances. The logic of inductive reason ing requires that where two major proposi tions lead to exactly similar minor premises there must be a more remote and larger premise which embraces both the major
is that whenever one person is by circum stances placed in such a position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those cir cumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."
