A Legal View of the Schley Inquiry. member of it, to make such a report to him. He treats that part of the report as " view s" of the presiding member. His decision is in line with the principle that a court of in quiry, or any member of it, may, in addition to reporting facts and opinions when ordered, add remarks upon matters wifchin the pre cept for the information and assistance of the convening authority, and as a means of fuller obedience to him, whatever decision he may come to upon them. But his implied disapproval indicates that if authority to ex press such views existed under the precept, it was not proper to express them after ex cluding evidence upon them. The decision of the President of the United States as above shown recognizes the authority as dis tinguished from the propriety of such ex pression. This is according to the statement of General William T. Sherman, quoted below, that military law belongs to a totally different system of jurisprudence from the law of civil courts. This principle of au thority holds whether such a court acts in private or in public. In either case its members are confidential advisers under an order of their superior officer. The mere fact that these proceedings were public does not affect their legal character. Publicity, so far from changing the power and duty of any member of the court to report fully to his commanding officer what such member deems to be required by the precept, the evidence, and military law, throws upon the people generally the responsibility of studying thoroughly and considering fairly such faithfulness of a public servant, whether it approves or not of such public servant's views. Government of the people, by the people, for the people, is ndt as easy a job in the life of any one of . the people as might be supposed from the rapid judgments ex pressed, even with patriotic vituperation, by. spectators of the court, whose sessions were
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open not merely in order that public curios ity and vanity might be gratified for political reasons, but, also, for deeper reasons last ing from administration to administration throughout the existence of our government, —rthe reason that the people can only become sober and just judges of public servants by being trusted with the knowledge of the de tails of their work; the reason that the peo ple, having the right to such knowledge, must share with its public servants the embarrass ing choice whether to temporize with in evitable evils or to use radical measures to reform them altogether; and the grave re sponsibility of action that stirs at least one entire nation. During the sensation over the dissent of the president of the court, it seemed to es cape the attention of some writers who stood as partisans against the applicant, that the very fact that Admiral Dewey dissented, nevertheless strengthened the findings and opinions of the court in which he joined. The Secretary of the Navy, by the use of the words full court," expresses the con struction that the presiding member joined in those findings from which he did not ex pressly dissent. The President of the United States says " the court of inquiry was unani mous in its findings of fact and unanimous in its expression of opinion on most of its findings of fact." Admiral Dewey's opinion that the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made with all possible despatch for the reason he gives, to arrive with as much coal in the ships as possible at Cienfuegos, is the only point on which he expressly differs from the rest of the court, who held that the utmost des patch was required. They held that the blockade of Cienfuegos should have been "close"; he held that it was "effective." They held that he should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago with all des
