"No, I don't think it was." This, of course, was disposed of with the question. In this connection it is interesting to com pare the answer given, and then excluded, with that given by Lord Mulgrave at the trial of Admiral Keppel. Lord Mulgrave declined to answer a question as to opinion. The following question was put to him: "To your knowledge and observation did Admiral Keppel negligently perform the duty im posed on him on the 27th or 28th of July?" He answered: "1 have taken an oath to answer the truth to all questions; I look upon opinions to be matters liable to error; I have answered every fact that has come within my knowledge as distinctly as I could; I hope the court will not press upon me to give my opinions. I have always thought that the opinions and thoughts of individuals were sacred; I have declined, to my most intimate friends, giving any opin ion upon this case; the court, who are to form their opinions upon the evidence, take an oath not to divulge each other's opinions. I hope the justice, candor, and reason of the court will extend that protection to me, which the law has given to them, and that I shall not be called upon to give any opin ion. The court are to judge of the facts before them, and I should think myself in a most disagreeable situation as a witness, if I am to be called to answer, upon my oath, to that which is matter of opinion; and, per haps, after giving it to-day, at another time I may alter my opinion, and think it not a just one. The facts I can speak to as mat ters of knowledge—as to opinions I cannot." When urged, he said: "The term negli gence implies a crime. I must be equal to the duty of an admiral commanding in chief, before I can decide, upon oath whether he did his duty properly or not. It is for this court to decide that, and not for me. I have answered the facts, and. if I am to be urged more by the court, it is not the Admiral ac cused, but it is me that they are trying, be cause I am to form an opinion how that
fleet was to be conducted, and not the man who commanded it." The court in that case retired, and after deliberation decided that the question should be put to him again, but that for the reasons he had given he might answer or decline to answer. The question was ac cordingly put, and he declined to answer. In the Schley Inquiry, sooner or later however, some such answer was to be ex pected to be got at by dint of skilful ques tioning, and the assistant of the Judge Ad vocate asked a subsequent witness, "What was left undone to destroy the 'Colon'?" Mr. Rayner objected that the question should be restricted by reference to certain regulations, and it was accordingly modi fied by instructions to the witness, who an swered, '"The whole force was not used on a defined plan." Not content with this advantage, Mr. Solicitor Hanna asked a question which brought out one of the limitations binding even experts when they happen to have military responsibilities added to their knowl edge of the art of war. "Why was that im portant?" he asked. Upon objection, the question was withdrawn, and the president said that "questions calling for the opinion of a junior on the action of his superior ought not to be asked." Almost inevitably, the "belief" of this and that officer, as to the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet before it was discovered, was testified to. But an objection to a question asking for this was afterwards sustained. Questions not directly reflecting upon a superior were permitted, for instance, as to the "strength" of the land batteries in a bombardment of June 16. The government went even so far as to ask for an opinion involving an argumenta tive answer. An officer who had feared a collision be tween two vessels of our fleet, the danger of which was disputed, was asked when his
