146
The
Green Bag.
NOTES. EXTRACT FROM THE PRECEPT. The precept contained the following specifications for inquiry concerning Commodore Schley : "(1). His conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign. "(2) The circumstances attending, the reasons con trolling, and the propriety of the movements of the • Flying Squadron' off Cienfuegos in May, 1898. "(3). The circumstances attending, the reasons con trolling, and the propriety of the movements of the said squadron in proceeding from Cienfuegos to Santiago. '. (4). The circumstances attending the arrival of the ' Flying Squadron ' off Santiago, the reasons for its retro grade turn westward, and departure from off Santiago, and the propriety thereof. •' (5). The circumstances attending and the reasons for the disobedience liy Commodore Schley of the orders of the department contained in its dispatch dated May 25, 1898, and the propriety of his conduct in the premises. "(6). The condition of the coal supply of the ' Flying Squadron,' on and about May 27, 1898; its coaling facil ities; the necessity, if any, for, or advisability of, the re turn of the squadron to Key West to coal; and the ac curacy and propriety of the official reports made by Commodore Schley with respect to this matter. "(7). Whether or not every effort incumbent upon the commanding officer of a fleet under such circum stances was made to capture or destroy the Spanish cruiser 'Colon' as she lay at anchor in the entrance to Santiago harbor, May 27 to 31, inclusive, and the neces sity for, or advisability of, engaging the batteries at the entrance to Santiago harbor, and the Spanish vessels at anchor within the entrance to said harbor, at the ranges used, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises. (8). The necessity, if any, for, and advisability of, withdrawing at night the1 Flying Squadron' from the en trance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea, if such shall be found to have been the case; the extent and character of such withdrawal; and whether or not a close or adequate blockade of said harbor, to prevent the es cape of the enemy's vessels therefrom, was established, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises. "(9). The position of the ' Brooklyn ' on the morning of July 3, 1898, at the time of the exit of the Spanish ves sels from the harbor of Santiago, the circumstances at tending, the reasons for, and the incidents resulting from the turuingof the . Brooklyn ' in the direction in which she turned at or about the beginning of the action with said Spanish vessels, and the possibility of thereby colliding with or endangering any other of the vessels of the United States fleet, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises. "(10). The circumstances leading to, and the inci dents and results of. a controversy with Lieut. Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. Navy, who, on July 3, 1898, during the battle of Santiago, was navigator of the ' Brooklyn,' in re lation to the turning of the ' Brooklyn ' : also the colloquy at that time between Commodore Schley and Lieut. Hodgson, and the ensuing correspondence between them on the subject thereof and the propriety of the conduct of Admiral Schley in the premises." The precept also says that : "The foregoing specific directions are given primarily for the information and guidance of the Court, but do
not limit or restrict the scope of its inquiry into the ' en tire matter,' the investigation of which is asked by the officer concerned. "Rear-Admiral Schley has been informed of his right to be present, either in person or by counsel, during the investigation, to cross-examine witnesses and to offer evidence before the Court, should he so desire. The Court may at any time grant to others interested and entitled thereto like privileges. "The investigation will be held in open court." There is not space to reprint the Court's report of the facts. Their opinions and the decision of the Secretary of the Navy and the decision of the President of the United States contained in his Memorandum on the appeal are here given. THE OPINION OF THE COURT. Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squad ron, should have proceeded with utmost dispatch off Cien fuegos, and should have maintained a close blockade of that port. He should have endeavored on May 23, at Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating w ith the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8. 15 a.m. of that date. He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to San tiago de Cuba with all dispatch and, should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron. He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle. He should not have made the retrograde turn west ward with his squadron. He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Depart ment's order of May 25. He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29 and 30. He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the " Colon " and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31. By commencing the engagementon July 3 with the port battery, and turning the " Brooklyn" around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the "Vizcaya" and "Colon." The turn of the " Brooklyn" to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made toward the "Texas," and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision. Admiral Schleydid injustice to I.ieutenantConimander A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the corre spondence which passed between them. Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1S98, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise. His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading. His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-pos sessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subor dinate officers and men to fight courageously.
