Again, whatever theory of punishment a judge may most incline to, he may have to subordinate it to special circumstances. For example, the frequency of an offence in a particular district, or the fact that it is more dangerous there than elsewhere, may require him to give the first place to the deterrent theory, although, apart from such special circumstances, he would be disposed to assign to that theory the last place, or possibly ignore it altogether. Lastly, it may well be that a judge may make a distinction between individual offend ers whose offences, when considered objec tively, are the same. He may, for instance, attach importance (a) to previous convic tions, even when these do not form a statu tory ground for augmenting the sentence; (b) to the moral character of the offender apart from his judicial record; (c) to the degree of the offender's intelligence and education; (d) to the difficulties he has had to encounter in the past; (e) to the extraor dinary temptations by which he was sur rounded at the time of the commission of his offence. These distinctions may be fur ther varied, according as the offender is a man in the prime of life, a man far advanced in years, a woman, or a child. Bearing in mind these considerations, the commission, whilst welcoming any general observations, requests brief answers to all or any of the following questions : — Question i. Does the judge, in fact, when awarding a sentence, act on any theory as to the object of punishment, such as retri bution, expiation, reformation of the offender, or the like? Is it desirable that he should do so?
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Question 2. Does the judge, in fact, keep the same end in view in the case of all offences, or does he make a distinction be tween one offence and another? Is it desir able that' he should do so? Question 3. When he makes a distinc tion between one offence and another, on what is the distinction based? On the char acter of the punishable act looked at from a moral standpoint? On the greater or less frequency of the crime in the district? On the greater or less risk to which it exposes the community, or on any and what other circumstances? Question 4. When he makes a distinc tion between one individual and another, does the distinction turn on the offender's antecedents as shpwn by his judicial record, or on his degree of intelligence and educa tion, or on any other, and what circum stance? Is the age or sex of the offender taken into account, and, if so, to what ex tent? Is it desirable that any, and which of the distinctions above mentioned, should be made? Question 5. In the absence of special circumstances, does the judge award the full penalty allowed by the law, or does his nor mal sentence fall short of this? The idea of the commission is to secure replies, so far as possible, from those who have had wide experience in the administra tion of the law, and from those who have given special study to this class of subjects in connection with criminal matters. Already several eminent American lawyers have been appealed to, and their replies will be incor porated in the report of the commission. Stuff Gown.
