given or acknowledged in any such action or suit, and all proceedings upon or by pre text or color of such action or suit, writ or process, and all judgments had thereupon, are utterly null and void, to all intents, con structions, and purposes whatsoever." In the course of time it became necessary to interpret this statute and the question arose whether or not the statute was amend atory or merely declaratory of the law of na tions. The statute clearly recognizes the law of nations as existent, but was it introduced by the statute and made binding as English law thereby, or was the penalty or sanction the only new thing in the act? In the case of Triquet r. Bath, 1764 (3 Bur. 1478) it was squarely held by Lord Mansfield, C. J., that the law of nations was part of the law of England, as appears from the quoted portions of the judgment of the court : "I remember in a case before Lord Talbot, of Buvot v. Barbut, upon a motion to discharge the defendant (who was in execu tion for not performing a decree), 'Because he was agent of commerce, commissioned by the King of Prussia, and received here as such': the matter was very elaborately ar gued" at the bar; and a solemn, deliberate opinion given by the court. These questions arose and were discussed.—'Whether a min ister could, by any act or acts, waive his privilege.'—'Whether being a trader was any objection pgainst allowing privilege to a min ister, personally.'—'Whether an agent of commerce, or even a consul, was entitled to the privileges of a public minister.'—'What was the rule of decision: the act of Parlia ment or the law of nations.' Lord Talbot declared a clear opinion—"That the law of nations, in its full extent, was part of the law of England.'—That the act of Parlia ment was declaratory, and occasioned by a particular incident.'—'That the law of na tions was to be collected from the practice of different nations, and the authority of
writers.' Accordingly, he argued and de termined from such instances, and the au thority of Grotius, Barbeyrac, Binkershoek, Wiquefort, etc.; there being no English writer of eminence upon the subject. "I was counsel in this case, and have a full note of it. "I remember, too, Lord Hardwicke's de claring his opinion to the same effect; and denying that Lord Chief Justice Holt ever had any doubt as to the law of nations be ing part of the law of England, upon the oc casion of the arrest of the Russian ambas sador." The same great judge reasserted this view in the later case of Heathfield v. Chilton, 1767, (4 Bur. 2015) in which it is said: "Lord Mansfield—'The privileges of public ministers and their retinue depend upon the law of nations; which is part of the common law of England. And the act of Parliament of 7 Ann. c. 12 did not intend to alter, nor can alter the law of nations. His lordship recited the history of that act, and the occa sion of it, and referred to the annals of that time. He said there is not one of the pro visions in that act which is not warranted by the law of nations.'" To the same effect is the opinion of Ful ler, C. J., in Re Baiz, 1889, (135 U. S. 403, 420). "Sections 4062, 4063, 4064, and 4065 were originally sections 25, 26, 27, and 28 of the Crimes Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, i Stat. 118; and these were drawn from the Statute of Anne, c. 12, which was declaratory simply of the law of nations, which Lord Mansfield observed, in Heathfield v. Chilton, 4 Bur row, 2015, 2016, the Act did not intend to alter, and could not alter." From the courts the doctrine passed into the text-books, and Blackstone, who had been counsel in both the cases cited, laid it down as undisputed law in his Commen taries, (1765): "Therefore the law of na tions (wherever any question arises which
