may have been due his mastery of his native tungue; at all events, no other justice of the court has surpassed the ease, accuracy and finish of his written style. It is, indeed, surprising that among so many men of ster ling ability the court should have had so few scholarly writers. Marshall, Taney, Curtis and Miller disclosed the utmost possiblities of severely plain and massive discourse, and Story, Bradley and others have illustrated the effect of a more elaborate and ornamental manner of speech. But a style which cannot be labeled with the marks of either of these extremes, which is easy but accurate, concise but not bare, and which, above all, is characterized by an indefinable air of distinc tion, has been rare. Justice Grier's learning and research were beyond doubt, but they are not forced upon the reader in a mass of needless quotations and the mechanical ci tation of a multitude of authorities. He gives, not the raw materials of an argument or exposition, but the results of his search for a guiding principle, reduced to form, and supported by illustrations and authorities which are the result of discrimination and taste. His expositions are always clear in statement and confined to the issues; proba bly no other justice contributed less dicta to the reports. The affectionate and eulogistic resolution in which the bar expressed its re gret upon the occasion of his retirement re ferred particularly to "his rich and varied learning, his clear comprehension of legal principles, his power of close reasoning and forcible expression, his uprightness, simplic ity and independence of character, his zeal and faithfulness in the discharge of his ju dicial duties, his pure and blameless per sonal life, and his kind and courteous bear ing to members of the bar. His dissenting opinion in Gaines v. Hen nen, 20 Howard, 591, is a characteristic specimen of his style. "I wholly dissent," he said, "from the opinion of the majority of the court in this case, both as to the law
and the facts. But I do not think it neces sary to vindicate my opinion by again pre senting to the public view a history of the scandalous gossip which has been buried un der the dust of half a century, and which a proper feeling of delicacy should have suf fered to remain so. I therefore dismiss the case, as I hope, for the last time, with the single remark that if it be the law of Louisi ana that a will can be established by the dim recollections, imaginations or inventions of anile gossips, after forty-five years, to dis turb the titles and possessions of bona fide holders, without notice, of an apparently in defeasible legal title, 'hand cqitidcm invideo, miror magis.'" In accepting Justice Grier's resignation, President Grant publicly recognized "the great public service which you were able to render to your country, in the darkest hour of her history, by the vigor and patriotic firmness with which you upheld the just powers of the government and vindicated the right of the nation to maintain its own ex istence." This has reference to Tustice Grier's memorable opinion in the Prize Cases, involving the President's right to insti tute a blockade, and the rights and liabilities of neutrals with respect thereto. The crisis involved in the determination of these cases has been graphically described by Richard Henry Dana, to whose distinguished advo cacy the result was mainly due. "The gov ernment is carrying on a war. It is exert ing all. the powers of war. Yet the claim ants of the captured vessels not only seek to save their vessels by denying that they are liable to capture, but deny the right of the Government to exercise war powers—deny that this can be, in point of law, a war. . . . Contemplate . . . the possibility of the Su preme Court deciding that this blockade is illegal! What a position it would put us in before the world, whose commerce we have been illegally prohibiting, whom we have unlawfully subjected to a cotton famine
