The Law as to the Boycott. The language had gotten now a new word —boycott—to commemorate that event. A new danger had been made known which spread terror throughout society. A new condition, therefore, confronted the law re quiring its protection. For indeed the situa tion was new. It is true that conspiracy was a recognized word, was a known wrong, and was a legal head. But this new combination was the opposite of the old. In the old con spiracy the object of the combination was to do something to a person directly; in the new conspiracy the object was to do nothing to a person directly. All this required a new law of conspiracy which should be wider than the old, to cover both the conspiracy, the object of which was action, and the conspiracy, the object of which was inaction. To do this it was necessary to find a common denomina tor for both of these wrongs. This process involved the necessity of an accurate system in the law as to the boycott. The form that the law in relation to the boycott has reached is seen in the latest opinion upon that subject—the elaborate charge of the Lord Chief Baron Palles in the case of O'Keeffe v. Walsh and others in the King's Bench Division of Ireland, Novem ber 13. TQO2. This was a civil action for a boycott brought by the plaintiff, the victim, against tet> persons alleged to have cooper ated in the conspiracy. The evidence in the case is reviewed by the learned judge in his charge, so that some quotations from the first portion of it will put everyone in posses sion of the principal facts in issue. "That O'Keeffe was boycotted, at all events from the 3d of September. 1899, I did not hear denied by any of the learned coun sel, and that that was done intentionally be cause he was an object of dislike to the per sons assembled in Tallow, I did not hear disputed. The landlord, the Duke of Devon shire, procured the tenancv to be sold under the Land Act. O'Keeffe bought the tenancy
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in as trustee. He allowed the tenants to re main in possession for a year, no rent being paid at all. Then he proceeded to evict them. Of course, when the word eviction is used, the dogs of war are let loose. "I now come *o the matter which has a leal bearing on this case: was there, an agree ment to induce people not to deal with O'Keeffe, and if so, who were the parties to that agreement? The inception of the mat ter is in the second week of January, 1899, when there was a conversation between O'Keeffe and the defendant, P. F. Walsh. The evidence is that O'Keeffe said, 'You are cutting my throat behind my back, and inter fering with the Parkers about the possession of Roseville.' Now. mark Walsh's words. They are some of the most important in the case. He is sworn to have said; 'Yes, and he would continue to do so, until he put the green grass growing before my (O'Keeffe's) door, and he would do so in twelve ir.onths.' "The next important meeting was that of nth of June, 1899. Lawrence Walsh spoke opposite O'Keeffe's door and in his speech is contained that which may be treated as the first evidence of boycotting. He is proved to have referred to the eviction of the Parkers and to O'Keeffe and to have said that 'the people should unite and if they would, they would soon bring him'—presu mably O'Keeffe,—'to his knees. It was not because a man would get a bargain loaf at his shop that they should go and buy there.' This is the first suggestion I find that the people should not d«al with O'Keeffe; it is impossible that they can be withdrawn from you as not being evidence of an attempt to procure the boycotting of the plaintiff. "The meeting that was afterwards held on the 3rd of September, 1899, was so held at the invitation and request of all the defend ants here, its object was to make the boycot ting of O'Keeffe more close and more op
