The Law as to the Boycott. What is the right, then—the legal right? The ruling case in this matter is now Quinn v. Leatham, 1901, A. C., 495. The plaintiff in this case was a flesher, the defendant was an officer in a butchers' union. Because the plaintiff would not discharge a non-union man in his employ—he was non-union be cause the union refused to take him in—the defendant threatened to call a strike of his union, not against the plaintiff, but against one of the customers of the plaintiff. That customer decided to give up the plaintiff and keep his employes when confronted with that alternative. The House of Lords at last held that all this made out a cause of action. One part of the opinion of Lord Lindley was as follows: "As to the plaintiff's rights: He had the ordinary rights of a British subject. He was at liberty to earn his own liv ing in his own way, provided . . . he did not infringe the rights of other people. This liberty involved liberty to deal with other per sons who were willing to deal with him. This liberty is a right recognized by law; its cor relative is the general duty of every one not to prevent the free exercise of this liberty, except so far as his own liberty of action may justify him in so doing. But a person's lib erty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with him affects him. ... If the interference is wrongful and is intended to damage a third person, and he is damaged in fact—in other words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others, and is thereby damnified— the whole aspect of the case is changed^ the wrong done to others reaches him, his rights are infringed although indirectly, and dam age to him is not remote or unforeseen, but is the direct consequence of what has been done. Our law, as I understand it, is not so defective as to refuse him a remedy by an action under such circumstances." A late case in America which throws much
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light upon the right of the plaintiff against boycott is Hundley v. Louisville Railroad, 105 Ky. 162. It was averred in the petition that the plaintiff had no trade or calling except railroading; that for the past five years he has been in the employment of the de fendant; that while engaged in the discharge of his duties he was wrongfully discharged by it; that it wrongfully blacklisted him, by placing upon its records a pretended cause of discharge, to wit, neglect of duty, with a view of injuring and preventing him from enter ing its employment or that of other railroad companies by which its employes discharged for cause will not be given employment by other railroad companies; that, on account of its conspiracy with other railroad com panies, he has been deprived of the right to again engage in the employment of the de fendant or other railroad companies; that the wrongful acts mentioned were committed for the purpose of making, and had made, it im possible for him to ever again get employ ment from the defendant on any of its lines, or from other railroad companies in the United States; and that he has been dam aged thereby in the sum of $5000. Mr. justice Paynter held for the plaintiff upon this basis: "It is the part of every man's civil rights to enter into any lawful business, and to assume business relations with any person. . . . If he is wrongfully deprived of these rights, he is entitled to redress. Every person is entitled to pursue any law ful trade, occupation, or calling. It is part of his civil Hghts to do so. He is as much entitled to pursue his trade; occupation, or calling, and be protected in it, as is the citizen in his life, liberty and property. Whoever wrongfully prevents him from doing so in flicts an actionable injury. For every injurysuffered by reason of a malicious act done to a man's occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood, an action lies. Such an act is an invasion of legal rights." What the right of the plaintiff is as an ab-
