(2 Ball. 409; 13 How. 52, n.), an act of Con gress was first declared unconstitutional in Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch 137, in 1803. From 1803 to 1864 there was only one in stance of the exercise of such a power (United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, in 1851.) During- the next twenty-five years, however, this power was exercised fifteen times. Prior to 1860 less than fifty statutes and ordinances of States and Territories had been declared unconstitutional by the court. Between 1860 and 1889 the court nullified such acts in more than one hundred and thirty cases.1 Since the outbreak of the Civil War there have been (exclusive of the present bench) fifteen justices. Chief among them in intel lect and length of service were Miller, Field, Bradley and Gray. In the second rank of historical significance come Swayne, Chase, Strong, Waite and perhaps Blatchford. The remain'ng justices were Davis, Hunt, Wcods, Matthews, Lamar and Jackson. It may be well to consider these three groups of justices in inverse order, beginning with those who, by reason of their brief ser vice or otherwise, attained least distinction. Justice Davis (1862-77) was the only jus tice during the century who abandoned the bench for political preferment. His recorded opinions, from the second Black to the ninety-fourth United States, are respectable, but not noteworthy. He was not a good writer, and his written opinions are said to have been subjected to revision by the re porter. His splendid opinion in ex partc MilHgan, 4 Wallace 2, is a genuine tour dc force. Justice Hunt (1873-82) was stricken with paralysis before he had completed ten years of service, and was retired on a pension by special act of Congress. His opinions, which are often made up largely of citations 1 These figures are taken from statistics printed by Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis in 1889, in an appendix' to the one hundred and thirty-first volume of the court reports. The numbers would now require material additions.
from New York cases, with which his judicial experience in that State had made' him most familiar, are not, in general, characterized by conspicuous force. Probably his best efforts were United States r. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 ib. 405; Pennoyer v. Xeff, 95 ib. 714; Life Insurance Company v. Terry, 15 Wallace 580; Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 ib. 357; Insurance Company v. Morse, 20 Wallace 445: Crapo r. Kelly, 16 ib. 610; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, and Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wallace 107. Justice Woods' brief service (1880-87) was characterized by great industry. Probably no other judge wrote so many opinions dur ing such a short service. He was very pro ficient in patent and equity cases. His style may be seen in United States v. Harris, 16 Otto 629; Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210; Presser i>. State of Illinois, 116 ib. 252; Mo bile r. Watson, 116 ib. 620; Wiggins Ferry Company v. State of Illinois, 107 ib. 419; Findlay 2>. McAllister, 113 ib. 930; Hender son r. Wardsworth, 115 ib. 377. Justice Matthews (1881-89) was known to be a man of brilliant powers, but consider able doubt was felt at the time of his appoint ment whether he had the judicial tempera ment necessary for the satisfactory discharge of the duties of his great office. During his brief service these apprehensions were quite completely dispelled. The reports contain convincing evidence of his mental powers and scholarship. One of his ablest efforts was his opinion in Pritchard v. Norton, in which he maintained, with great research, that the validity of a bond, as to the suffi ciency of its consideration, is to be deter mined neither by the lex fori nor by the law of the place where it was made, but rather by the law in contemplation of the contracting parties as the law of the place of its perform ance. His dissenting opinion in Kring v. State of Missouri is still considered by many good judges to be more convincing than Jus
