as late in life as Justice Strong (1870-80) ever rendered such conspicuous service. He had given good evidence of judicial capacity as a justice of the Supreme Court of Penn sylvania, and throughout his term took an active part in the work of the United States Supreme Court. To say that his work com pares favorably with the best efforts of the distinguished judges with whom he served during the decade from 1870 to 1880 is to pay a high compliment to his mental pow ers.1 On constitutional questions he be lieved in a broad and liberal construction of national powers. Coming to the bench without the prestige of any of his predecessors, Chief Justice Waite (1874-88) soon won the respect of his colleagues and of the profession by his mod est demeanor, his great industry and his un common administrative ability. His business like superintendence of the work of the court was of great consequence at a time when the business of the court was increasing so rapidly. During the first seventv-five years of the court's history the published reports had not averaged one a year; five volumes had been issued prior to Marshall's time, twenty-seven under Marshall, and thirty-six under Taney. The business of the court in creased slowly during the first years of Taney's service, but from 1850 the increase 1 Some of Justice Strong's interesting and able opin ions may be found in State of Tennessee -: Davis, 100 U. S. 257; Strauder r1. State of West Virginia, loo U. S. 303; Knox i'. Lee, 12 Wallace 457; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3; Ex-parte Virginia, 100 ib. 313; Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339; Munn -'. State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Corbett-'. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464; Miller?'. United States, ii Wallace 268; State of Virginia v. Rives, loo U. S. 313; The Scotia, 14 Wallace 170; Blyew v. United States, 13 il>. 581; Reading Railroad Company p. State of Pennsylvania, 15 ib. 232; State of South Carolina -/. State of Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; the Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432; Stewait r. Sonneborn, 98 it 187; Boon T. /Etna Insurance Com pany, 12 Blatchford 24, 95 U. S. I; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Company, 93 ib. 174; Shaw r'. Rail road Company, 101 ib. 557; Milwaukee & C. Railway --. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 ib. 700; see also, in the Pennsylvania Reports, Caldwell v. Ful ton, 31 Pa. St. 475; Rogers v. Gilinger, 30 it. 185; Muff v. McCauley, 53 ib. 206; Pennsylvania Railroad rr. Allen, S3 »*• 2?6.
was more rapid. Beginning with about seventy cases in that year, the annual average had increased to something over four hun dred during Waite's tenure. At the middle of the century the court's calendar did not average one hundred and forty causes, and had never reached three hundred in any term; in 1890 it numbered fif teen hundred causes. The work of the court during this time was not only large in volume, but of great importance and diffi culty. Some of the most perplexing prob lems arising out of the Civil War still awaited solution, and the rapid development of com merce and industry which followed the restoration of peace brought before the court new and complex issues. Amidst ihe pas sions which enveloped the former, and throughout the intricacies of the latter, Chief Justice Waite preserved the calm and steady attitude of a mind conscientiously searching for the truth. One of his most interesting opinions was given in the case of Reynolds v. United States, which arose under the stat utes designed to suppress bigamy in the Ter ritories. The chief justice examined the his tory of religious freedom, and the nature, scope and relations of the marriage contract, and held that, although Congress could not prohibit the free exercise of religion, yet it was clearly within the power of every civil government to determine what should be the law of its own social life. It could not be, he said, that those who were by religion polygamists could commit an act which the law de clared to be a crime and go unpunished, while those who were not polygamdsts were amenable to punishment. "Suppose one be lieved that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; could it be seri ously contended that the civil government under which we live could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or, if a wife justly be lieved it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pyre of1 her husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government
