the rights of individuals, no other course was open to him. In most cases the differ ence was one of principle, as to which there could be no compromise. Justice Field, was, then, no mere obstruc tionist. Without asserting that his course was entirely consistent, its guiding principle is plain. He was a strenuous defender of the (civil rights of personal security and private property—the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, in time of war as w»ll as in peace, and against the aggres sions of all power, whether State or national; while, with respect to the political powers of the national government, especially when not involved with questions of private right, he was a strict constructionist. These views iat once brought him into conflict with the majority of his colleagues, and into disfavor with the prevailing public sentiment. But he was the last man to be influenced in the per formance of his duty as he understood it by iany such considerations. As far as I am aware, he referred to them only once in his judicial opinions. In concluding his powerful dissenting opinion in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, he said: "In the discussions which have attended this subject of legal tenders there has been at times what seemed to me to be a covert inttimation that opposition to the measure in question was the expression of a spirit not altogether favorable to the cause in the inter est of which that measure was adopted. All such intimations I repel with all the energy I can express. I do not yield to anyone in honoring and reverencing the noble and pa triotic men who were iri the councils of the nation during the terrible struggle with the [Rebellion. To them belong the greatest of all glories in our history—that of having saved the Union, and that of having eman cipated a race. For these results they will be remembered and' honored so long as the English language is spoken or read among men. But I do not admit that a blind ap
proval of every measure which they may have thought essential to put down the Re bellion is any evidence of loyalty to the country. The only loyalty which I can ad mit consists in obedience to the Constitution and laws made in pursuance of it. It is only by obedience that affection and reverence can be shown to a superior having a right to command. So thought our Great Master when he said to his disciples: 'If ye love me, keep my commandments.'" The record of Justice Field's judicial ser vice is made up of one thousand and fortytwo opinions: six hundred and twenty in the (Supreme Court of the United States, fiftyseven in the United States Circuit Court, and three hundred and sixty-five in the Supreme Court of California. From such vast labors a few leading cases may be cited in substan tiation of the foregoing characterization. Justice Field's guiding principle was the protection of individual rights of personal security and private property. In his view, these rights were closely related. "If," he said in the Sinking Fund Cases, "contracts are not observed, no prop erty will in the end be respected; and all his'tory shows that the rights of persons are un safe when property is insecure. Protection to one goes with protection to the other, and there can be neither prosperity nor progress where this foundation of all just government is unsettled." And there was in his theory this corollary, that these inalienable rights must be secured equally and impartially to all. His general attitude and tendency toward individual rights is indicated) in the differ ence of opinion between Justice Bradley and himself in Ex parte Wall. 107 U. S. 265. Compare, to the same effect, his dissenting opinion in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, with Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in Chicago, etc., Railroad Company v. Minne sota, 134 U. S. 418. His views of individual liberty were most definitely formulated in
