The Right of Privacy. painter or sculptor. Is it to be limited to this or given a larger meaning? Will not a pen picture as vividly portray the subject and invade privacy? May not a pen portrait of fend the feelings and distress the subject more acutely than any other reproduction of a likeness? If so, why should it not be re strained as a violation of the right of privacy? Does not the license of yellow publicitysuggest the absolute need of and establish the principle and righteousness of privacy? Does not the publication of purely personal individual matters without any public signifi cance or excuse, shock the verities of exis tence? Or is it only a question of taste? Or does its existence question the right of pub licity in the premises? Does not every such unpermitted breach contain in itself a protest that the individual ought to have been let alone? Is not the ought but an expression of the right to be let alone? If an individual of a purely private char acter lives within the law, ought he not to be let alone in so much of his life as is his own private concern and which he has in no way dedicated to the public? Ought not the in dividual of a public character be let alone in so much of his private life as is no part of his public life? The position the individual occupies in the social and political world as a citizen and laborer, his birth, education, marriage and death, and many other facts of existence may be said to be incidents of a public character. But are there not many incidents in his life which are his own and which ought to be his own as a right of pri vacy, and as to which ought it not to be said to the press "hands off?" In every true man's heart there is a re spect for privacy, and nowhere in the world does this redound more to the honor of man kind than among the gentlemen composing the realm of the fourth estate. Private mat ters, secrets of souls, have come to them by confession and otherwise, all of which are re spected unless permission is given to use.
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Examples of heroic self-sacrifice to this trust of privacy are of frequent occurence. This condition, by a logic of common sense, means that there is a right of privacy which is re spected by the reputable press and ought to be legally recognized and enforced upon all ethers. Nor ought this to be unconstitutional. The freedom of speech and of the press guar anteed by the Constitution, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citi zen may please and to be protected from any responsibility for so doing, except so far as such publication by reason of its blasphemy, obscenity or scandalous character may be a public offence, or by its falsehood and malice may injuriously affect the standing, reputa tion or pecuniary interests of the individual. Would it not be entirely right and just for the court of last resort to further say that this freedom is guaranteed, except so far as it invades and violates the right of privacy? Any freedom enjoyed at the expense of a right is not a liberty, but a license, and it ought to be strictly technical to so interpret the Constitution. Should there not be a right of privacy which the public press could not invade, and in which every private individual or every individual in his private character would be let alone? Ought there not to be a right of privacy, a freedom from public molestation by un necessary and avoidable noise? Much noise is thoughtlessness and waste and without ex cuse in a public made up of individuals pos sessed of most delicate nervous systems. Are there not odors, and smoke, which in vade not only one's possessions, but also one's personality? Is not the thoughtless blowing of a whiff of tobacco smoke into the face of another, to the latter's nausea and distress, an invasion of a right of privacy? Noise, smoke and odor have been enjoined as nui sances. Is there not a higher right calling for their restraint? Are they not invasions of the right of privacy?
