Timothy Otis Howe. The arguments of the respondent's coun sel seem to present an almost inextric able confusion of two very distinct things. They have blended the person occupy ing the office with the office itself. They seem to have labored under the idea that the moment a man gets possession of the office of Governor, he was somehow dissolved in the office—held in solution in it—until by the analysis of revolution, he shall be de posited with the mass of the people. By their argument, there is no process for re moving an intruder into the office of Gov ernor, except by revolution, by force and violence, or by voluntary abdication of the individual himself. . . . Revolutions have often been resorted to, for the pur pose of overthrowing governments, but never to get possession of an office under a government. It may, indeed, be found nec essary to employ force to put the relator in possession of his rights. If the intimations of the respondent's counsel are to be relied upon, force will be necessary. But if so, the question remains, shall constitutional force be employed, or shall the relator be turned over to revolutionary force? May he rely upon the force of the government to give him that place in the government to which he is confessedly entitled, or must he rebel against the government in order to expel a usurper from one of the offices under it? The relator does not seek to sub vert the government, but only demands a constitutional right under it. Revolution, therefore, clearly cannot be his appropriate remedy. Revolution, if successful, would be as fatal to the purpose of the relator as. to that of the respondent. While it might drive the latter from the office, it would abrogate the office itself. Whatever position the relaator might assume in the State after a suc cessful revolution, he would hold by con quest and not by election." In another part of this interesting brief, Judge Howe replied to the suggestion of
counsel for the respondent, who argued at great length upon the equality and indepen dence of the three branches of government, using the following convincing language: "They have read from numerous political essayists in support of the position that the legislative, executive and judicial depart ments of the government are, or ought to be separate, independent, coordinate and co equal. There are, indeed, strong reasons why these departments should be separate and independent; but in fact, no government ever existed in which they were wholly so. Writers mean only this—that in all govern ments these three powers exist. They are the sum of every government; inherent in every government. Whenever the autocrat of the Russias performs an official act, he ex ercises one of these three powers. It is essential in a republic that each of these powers should be deposited with a different tribunal or agency—when combined in a single individual, the rights of persons are exceedingly precarious. Then the only hope of the citizen is that the depository may be wise, virtuous and just. When distributed, there is a chance, that if the judviary be cor rupt, the executive power may be place .1 in upright hands—and vice versa—and that if both be corrupt, the immediate representa tives of the people, in Legislature assem bled, may hold both in check. The Sultan of Turkey may register what arbitrary edicts he pleases—may apply them to the rights of his subjects as he pleases, and execute them or not as he pleases, and the security of the multitude depends upon the integrity of the individual. But in Wisconsin, if her Legis lature enact an oppressive law, the Governor may veto it. Or if lie approve it, the courts may pronounce it unconstitutional. But if all combine to oppress the citizen, the citi zens have only to combine to remove all. So that here the security of the individual depends upon the integrity of the multitude. Such are some of the advantages of having
