EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT uncontrolled power to tax, regulate, or even prohibit interstate commerce, and that it may use its power to accomplish results which are wholly beyond its jurisdiction. "If these two views of the Constitution represented merely the doct'ines of present and opposing schools of constitutional con struction, such a difference of opinion upon fundamental questions would still be unfortu nate. If, however, this difference be not so much between schools as between present and past, if it mark a fundamental change in the national conception of the Constitution and in the spirit of its administration, the signifi cance of the policy toward which the country is moving becomes apparent; for important as undoubtedly are the economic questions whose agitation has given rise to new constitutional doctrines, the preservation of the Constitu tion is more important still." The author deprecates the growing impa tience with the safeguards of the constitu tion and the desire that the Federal govern ment should assume doubtful powers. "Power to regulate commerce, then, was not given as an indefinite jurisdiction, but was intended as a specific authority to effect cer tain well-understood ends. "The great purposes which it was sought by the Constitution to accomplish were four in number. It was necessary to establish a federal authority capable of raising a federal revenue, to regulate foreign relations, to pre vent the imposition of duties by particular states upon articles brought from other coun tries, or from or through other states, and to control navigation. These four great pur poses were each covered by express provision." The meaning of the commerce clause must be ascertained from the situation and methods of commerce as then conducted. This was chiefly by sailing vessels with foreign nations, and the power to retaliate on foreign nations for unjust commercial dues was a chief reason for conferring this power on Congress. As between the states the purpose was to prevent restrictions on commerce. From these small beginnings the author traces the growth of the present broad doctrine. Owing to an un fortunate limitation of the words "exports and imports ' ' in the clause forbidding the state to tax these subjects, it became necessary to found
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the prohibition of regulation of interstate rates upon the commerce clause, and when it was decided that the states were deprived of this it was assumed that the power had been granted to Congress. This the author regards as a strange inversion of the principle still taught in the schools for construction of state and federal constitutions, and he insists that the federal power has not so developed as to confer upon Congress the power of restriction which has been denied to the states, and that there are two express provisions preventing Congress from assuming this jurisdiction. The first is the right of citizens to engage in trade, which is a part of the liberty or property pro tected by the fifth and fourteenth amend ments of the Constitution. The author shows from the political theories most influential upon the framers of the constitution that the right of industry was included under liberty and property. This right to engage in com merce is subject to the federal jurisdiction in foreign affairs and to police regulations which Congress has the power to impose within con stitutional limitations. Congress cannot de prive any person of liberty nor exclude proper articles from interstate transportation, nor dis tinguish between proper occupations by reason of the personality of a shipper or consignee. The second limitation is the prohibition of tax ation of exports from any state by Congress. The author admits, however, that owing to the narrow interpretation given to the word "exports " in another clause, this maybe held in contradiction of its obvious meaning to apply only to exports to foreign countries. Verbal interpretation, however, and the obvi ous purposes of the provision in view of then existing conditions of commerce, show that it should apply also to interstate transactions. In conclusion the author again objects to the assuming of powers by Congress and to the use of constitutional powers for unconstitu tional purposes. "It is clear, then, that the Constitutional Convention did not intend to give Congress power to tax or to prohibit commerce among the states, and that the nature of the power upon which it is sought to found such a juris diction fails to support it. As Mr. Chief Jus tice Fuller very forcibly remarked, ' under the Articles of Confederation the states might have
