THE ABUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION of affairs avoid jury duty. Educational re quirements have thus far been merely a farce in actual practice. In the matter of taking private property for public use, the constitutional provisions of the several states usually require that the jurors shall be freeholders. Thus, a higher grade of jurors is usually obtained. But in negligence cases, which by reason of their number have become much more impor tant, no such requirement exists. Defen dants are at the mercy of the caprice, prejudice, and vicarious generosity of com paratively low-grade men. I believe that a property qualification would materially im prove the character of our juries, and by getting the judgment of men who own property themselves and appreciate its value, results more akin to justice would be obtained. 6. The European legislation on this subject strikes me very favorably. It is per haps doubtful whether such enactments could be obtained in this country. I have not given the question of their constitution ality any consideration. But the present tendency of legislation on this subject re quires that some steps be taken to limit the extent of liability. As the result of the recent Federal deci sion affirming the validity of the Minnesota statute relative to fellow -servants, we may anticipate that similar enactments will be made in many other of the states. The decisions that employees do not as sume the risk of violation by the master of state laws for the safety of employees, even though the danger is obvious, have a similar tendency, viz: to render the master an insurer of the safety of his servant. At the same time, other statutes have been enacted under which there is less oppor tunity for speculation on the question of damages. In many of the states there exists a fixed limit of liability in case of death. Under the laws of Michigan for many years there has been no liability in case of instantaneous death as the result
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of injury, except for such damages as shall be deemed fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death, to those persons who may be entitled to such damages when recovered. As in many instances no one is so dependent on the deceased as to suffer pecuniary injury by his death, no recovery can be had. Until recently, however, if the injured person lived any appreciable length of time, the cause of action survived, and the admin istrator could recover all of the damages which accrued to the injured party himself. By the statute of 1905 this right of action has been taken from the administrator, whether death as the result of the injury is instantaneous or not. Thus, in all cases where death results from the injury, the ele ments of pain and suffering are eliminated. All such laws have a tendency to reduce the opportunity for speculation on the ques tion of damages. Now if the tendency is to enact laws which practically render the employer an insurer, why should not the measure of liability upon the insurance be fixed also? Why determine the fact of liability and leave the measure of damages open? In all kinds of insurance a limit of liabil ity is fixed. If this were not so insurance companies could not exist. Why, then, should manufacturing companies be com pelled to assume the liability of insurers without limitation as to damages? The logic of such enactments is apparent. It may be argued that the real extent of injury necessarily varies, that the loss of a limb, for instance, would be more injurious to one than to another. But it may be assumed that a fair amount would be fixed by the law and individual cases would have to give way to the general average. Statutes fixing liability in case of death re sult in the same inequality, but they have been sustained. Perhaps a measure of damages might be agreed upon by actual contract, but this would be impracticable in the case of large
