THE GREEN BAG
PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN ENGLAND BY R. NEWTON CRANE BEFORE considering the various stat utes which have been passed in Eng land to regulate the relations between master and servant and the liability of the former, and of tort feasors generally, for negligence which has resulted in personal injuries, it should be stated that actions for personal injuries are of comparatively minor impor tance in the English courts, whether consid ered from the point of view of their number or the amount of the damage awarded by the verdicts of juries. Exact figures are not ob tainable in either country, but it is safe to say that the English courts are not troubled with half so many of this class of actions as are docketed in the American courts, and that the amounts awarded in damages by English juries are not a tenth of those ob tained from American juries. There are several reasons for this. There are, for example, fewer railway and street accidents in England. The railways have no level crossings, their lines are securely fenced in, and their yards are inaccessible to the public. In the larger municipalities the power of the police in regulating the traffic is unlimited and is cheerfully acqui esced in by the drivers of all sorts of vehicles and by pedestrians. But the most impor tant circumstance in considering this matter is the fact that speculative actions, the tak ing up of damage cases on contingent fees, is practically unknown in the English courts. A solicitor, however willing he might be to give his services to a client in the hope of contingent reward, and even to advance the very considerable expenses attendant upon the litigation, would think seriously before paying down in cash from $200 to $500 to brief counsel to appear in court to conduct the action, and before making himself liable for a further like expenditure for "refresh ers," and other out-of-pockets incident to
the trial of the case in the court of first instance and on appeal. There is still another reason why actions for damages for negligence do. not realize large amounts in England, and that is the construction which has been placed upon Lord Campbell's Act. This Act, passed in 1846, extended the liability for injury, where death had not ensued, to actions where death was caused by "the wrongful act, neglect, or default" of the defendant. It was provided that such actions should be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death was so caused, and in every such action the jury might give such damages as they thought proportioned to the resulting injury to the parties respectively for whose benefit the action was brought; and the jury was fur ther authorized by their verdict to award the amount to which each of the parties respectively was entitled. Thus where a husband and father is killed and damages are awarded against the defendant through whose negligence death resulted, the jury may say what amount of such damages is to be paid to the widow and what amount is to be paid to the child or children respective ly, and how in the case of the children the award may be invested or held for their ben efit. Early in the history of the litigation which ensued in consequence of the Act, it was decided that actual pecuniary damage must have resulted from the death, and that the jury cannot give damages for mental sufferings, or loss of society, or for affliction, or as a solatium for injured feelings. It will be readily appreciated what effect this law and the construction placed upon it has had upon the limitation of the volume of personal injury actions, and what influence these principles has had upon subsequent legisla tion relating to the liability for damages for
