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THE GREEN BAG

Tried by another test he reaches the same result. The situs of personalty is at the domicile of the owner and a contract with reference thereto if valid by the law of the domicile is valid everywhere. The author then recites various exceptions to the rule (a) where chattel mortgages are executed and recorded in a foreign state at the time when the property is within the jurisdiction of the state in which suit is after wards brought, where they contravene some express law or settled public policy of the state. A debt has its situs at the domicile of the debtor, and an assignment of it is governed by law. A contract made with an order to immediate transfer of the property to another state is to be construed by the laws of that state. A transfer of property by operation of laws is governed by the law of the situs. "The genera] rule is founded on the cor rect principle that the mortgage with all its incidents should be governed by the lex loci contractus. That rule protects the mort gagee. It does not defraud creditors whose claims existed before the mortgage — - they have not been as diligent as the mortgagee in obtaining security; nor subsequent creditors, because their claims are inferior. Nor does it work any greater hardship upon innocent purchasers than in any other circumstances under which they have constructive but not actual notice. "The position of the Michigan, Pennsyl vania, and Tennessee courts is indefensible, except upon the ground that the doctrine of comity, imposes no obligation." MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. " Muni cipal Problems in Meclia-val Switzerland," by John Martin Vincent, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1905. NEGLIGENCE (Landlord and Tenant). "Liability of Lessor of Railroad for Lessee's Negligence Resulting in Injury to Latter's Employee," by Cyrus J. Wood, Central Law Journal (V. Ixii, p. 181). PERSONS (Infancy, Contracts). Cases re lating to " What Contracts of Employment are Binding upon Infants " are collected by C. B. Labatt in the March Canada Law Jour nal (V. xlii, p. 129). PERSONS (Names). G. S. Arnold con tributes to the March Yale Law Journal

(V. xv, p. 227) an article entitled " Personal Names." He traces first the history in Eng land of the gradual appearance of surnames owing partly to an early requirement for the record of births, marriages, and deaths. In time middle names became customary, but the law has always regarded these as unim portant. Apart from statutes any person may at will change his name, but in this country many states have legislated upon the subject. "A brief examination of these statutes, however, will show that, even in the instance where it is forbidden to engage in trade under a fictitious or assumed name the common law has really not been abrogated, and that these statutes have a very different effect from the cognate legislation in some of the European states." "A comparison of the results of these laws shows this distinction — in France and Ger many the usurpation of a name renders one liable in action either to the state or to the individual, in England and the United States, generally speaking, this is not true. More over it is evident that in the former countries a name is regarded as, in itself, and without considering it as an adjunct to trade, a prop erty right. In the latter this is not true. No man has a property right in his name per sc." "Aside from the question of direct pecuni ary interest, however, which in most cases the policy of our laws protects, and conse quently aside from the question of fraud — for fraud is the basis of the right of complaint — there is no remedy against a person who adopts the name of another. Abstractly, this seems unjust, for there can be a no more valuable patrimony than a good name; it is, though outside the pale of commerce, one of the most prized attributes of man. The arbi trary adoption of a person's name may cause him boundless annoyance, confusion, and humiliation." "While it cannot be denied, however, that the refusal of the courts to recognize the rights of a name as such and their natural and consistent hesitation in pronouncing the name property until its pecuniary value can be shown, result occasionally in great hard ships, instances of such results are surpris ingly rare. Theoretically incomplete, the law offnames shows how mostrsatisfactorily