252
THE GREEN BAG
pose of resale, and prayed for an injunction restraining defendants who were proprietors of the theatre from interfering with his business by posting signs stating that tickets sold on the sidewalk would be refused at the door and by employing private detectives to state to prospec tive purchasers from plaintiff that tickets so purchased would not be recognized by the manage ment of the theatre. Plaintiff was denied relief. A " theatre ticket," says the court, is a license issued by the proprietor, pursuant to the contract, as convenient evidence of the right of the holder to admission at the date named, subject to his observation of any reasonable conditions appear ing on the face thereof, and is revocable for a violation of such conditions. The tickets in question contained a clause providing that if sold by the purchaser at the sidewalk they would be refused at the door, and this provision is held to be valid and to become a part of the contract evi denced by the ticket and to remain a part thereof as long as the ticket exists, so that it is binding upon all subsequent holders with notice. It is pointed out that the owner of the theatre is under no obligation to permit a patron to enter the place upon any terms other than those which the owner may dictate. It is within the owner's power to charge what he chooses for admission without regard to the reasonableness of the rates, to limit the number that may be admitted, to refuse to sell tickets at all, and collect the price of admission at the door, to provide that no one under twentyone years of age shall be admitted, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or to make any other regulation which he may see fit. If the public dislikes such regulations, its only remedy is to refuse to buy the tickets. So it is held that the proprietor is fully within his rights in making the tickets subject to the condition that they shall not be sold on the sidewalk. WITNESSES. (Privileged Communications be tween Husband and Wife.) la. — The Iowa statute,
providing that neither husband nor wife can be examined as a witness as to any communication made by one to the other while married, receives judicial construction in Sexton v. Sexton, 105 N. W. Rep. 314. It would seem, as indeed the court frankly admits, that the statute was suffi ciently broad in its terms to be conclusive against the right to call either husband or wife to speak as a witness respecting communications had by them, no matter what the character thereof, or the occa sion or purpose. The court, however, recurs to the familiar principal that the real purpose and intent of the legislature is the thing which is to be enforced by the courts, and after a brief examina tion of the common-law origin of the rule, making communications between husband and wife privileged, arrives at the conclusion that whether common law or statutory, the rule is founded upon public policy and that it is only intended that confidences inherent in the marital relation or incident thereto should be protected. In this view the privilege embraces only the knowledge which the husband or wife obtains from the other, which, but for the marriage relation and confi dences growing out of it, would not have been communicated or which is of such a nature or character as that to repeat the same would tend to unduly embarass or disturb the parties in their marital relations. As so construed, the statute is held not to prohibit the wife from testifying in an action by her for the alienation of her husband's affections as to statements and declara tions by the husband addressed to her, showing former affection and the subsequent loss thereof. "Affection between husband and wife," says the court, " is the rule, and the law presumes it to exist. Indeed it is published to the world with the fact of marriage, and accordingly in no sense can it be a matter of marital confidence and as such subject to be violated by the one testifying to the acts, physical or verbal, commonly under stood to be declaratory thereof and in proof of the fact."
