NOTES OF RECENT CASES
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NOTES OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RECENT CASES COMPILED BY THE EDITORS OF THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM AND ANNOTATED BY SPECIALISTS IN THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS (Copies of the pamphlet Reporter! containing full reports of any of these decisions may be secured from the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 25 cents each. In ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well as the citation of volume and page of the Reporter in which it is printed.)
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. (Compensation of Attorney — Contingent Fee.) New York Sup. Ct. — In Johnson v. Ravitch, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1059, the Supreme Court, through Gaynor. J., holds that where by a contract between an attorney and client the attorney is to receive a contingent fee, for the prosecuting of a personal injury action and the client dismissed the attorney, he can on dismissal recover only for the services actually rendered up to that time. Every attorney enters into the service of his client subject to the rule that the client may dismiss or supersede it. If he makes a contract for future services it is neces sarily subject to such rules, and made with full knowledge that he may never perform such ser vices, and in that event he will not be paid therefor. CARRIERS. (Loss of Shipment — Evidence as to Damages.) Alabama. — In Southern Express Co. v. Owens, 41 South. 752, an action against a carrier for the loss of a manuscript, the question arose as to how the damages were to be deter mined in the absence of a market value. It appeared from the evidence that the manuscript was that of a history of the development of South Carolina literature, intended for a school text book, on which subject there was no text book; and the court concluded that under the circum stances it was proper, on the question of damages, to permit plaintiff to testify as to the time that he had spent in the preparation of the manuscript, and as to what he considered it worth. The court says that while it may be that property destroyed or lost has no market value, and that it may be that no rule absolutely certain can be laid down, plaintiff cannot on account of such circumstances be awarded merely nominal dam ages; but that where the article is unusual in character, so that the market value cannot be determined, plaintiff's damages must be ascer tained in some other rational way. " Where the article lost has no market value, the rule of dam ages seems to be its value to the plaintiff, in
ascertaining which inquiry may be made into the constituent elements of the cost to plaintiff in producing it." In support of this decision the court cites Green v. Boston R. Co., 128 Mass. 221, 35 Am. Rep. 370; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Stewart, 78 Miss. 600, 29 South. 394. CARRIERS. (Passengers — Injuries — Proxi mate Cause.) Colorado. — In Snyder v. Colorado Springs and Cripple Creek District Railway Com pany, 85 Pacific Reporter, 686, plaintiff became a passenger on a crowded car and stood near the door with his hand resting on the door jamb. Other passengers were standing between him and the door, and some on the steps of the car. The conductor in pushing his way through the crowd of passengers pressed plaintiff against one, who was sitting in a seat on the side of the car. Such person became angry and pushed plaintiff with such force that he was thrown from the car, pass ing over the head of a man standing on the lower step. The question, of course, was as to what was the proximate cause of the accident, and the court decided that the proximate cause was the action of the passenger who pushed plaintiff, and that hence the company was under no liability. The court cites from Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Sipcs, 26 Colo. 17, 55 Pac. 1093, where proximate cause was defined as that cause " which in natural and continued sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced the result complained of, and without which that result would not have occurred," and Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Budin, 6 Colo. App. 275, 40 Pac. 503, where proximate cause was considered to be an act which is the proximate cause of an event " when, in the natural order of things, and under the particular circumstances surrounding it, such an act would necessarily produce that event." Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co. (Mass.), 51 N. E. i, 41 L. R. A. 794; Lane v. Atlantic Works, in Mass. 136, are also cited for definitions of proximate cause. The court says: " it was of course possible that some
