NOTES OF RECENT CASES statutes, requiring notes given on the sale of patent rights to recite such fact upon their face. Tod v. Wick, 36 Ohio St. 370; Mason v. McLeod, 57 Kan. 105, 45 Pac. 76, 41 L. R. A. 548, 57 Am. St. Rep. 327; New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365, 9 N. E. 386, 58 Am. Rep. 40; Herdic v. Roessler, 109 N. Y. 127, 16 N. E. 198; Hankey v. Downey, 116 Ind. 118, 18 N. E. 271, i L. R. A. 447; Sandage v. Manufacturing Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N. E. 380, 34 L. R. A. 363, 51 Am. St. Rep. 165; Haskell v. Jones, 86 Pa. 173; Pinney v. Bank, 68 Kan. 223, 75 Pac. 119, and other cases denying the validity of such statutes: Pcgram v. Alkali Co. (C. C.) 122 Fed. 1000; Reeves v. Corning (C. C.) 51 Fed. 774, 787; Castle v. Hutchinson (C. C.) 25 Fed. 394; Helm v. Bank, 43 Ind. 167, 13 Am. Rep. 395; Cranson v. Smith, 37 Mich. 310, 26 Am. Rep. 514; Crittenden v. White, 23 Minn. 24, 23 Am. Rep. 676; Woolen v. Banker, 2 Flip. 33, Fed. Cas. No. 18,030; State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403; Wilch v. Phelps, 14 Neb. 134, 15 N. W. 361. DEAD BODIES. (Mutilation —• Damages — Mental Anguish.) Oklahoma. — Long v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Pac. 289, was an action by the parents of an infant child against a carrier, to recover damages for mental pain and anguish, occasioned by the mutilation of the dead body of the infant, owing to the negligence of defendant in transporting the remains, and liability is denied. The case of Foley v. Phelps, (Sup.) 37 N. Y. Supp. 471, is considered, where it was held that one might recover for the mutilation of a dead body of a relative, on the ground that such act is a violation of the legal right of the relative to have the body in the condition in which it was at the time of death, and that there is a remedy at law for the interference with every legal right; but the case is disapproved of, and it is held that there is no difference in principle between a recovery of a parent for mental pain and suffering caused by the death of a child from personal injury, and a recovery for the same as a result of the mutilation of its body after death. The court says: " The position in which the courts declare the right by reason of the quasi property interest of the relative is the only one which can be supported by any degree of logic, but those courts fail to recognize that the dead body of a relative, neither by the natural law of mankind, by the common law of England, nor by the statu tory-law of the states, may be sold for personal gain or disposed of, except by burial, . . . and has correctly said ' A dead body belongs to no one, and is under the protection of the public.'" Though the cases upon the subject cannot be reconciled, the conclusion in this case seems opposed to the weight of authority. Several im
631
portant cases are not noticed in the opinion, though it seems scarcely conceivable that they were not brought to the attention of the court. Foremost among them is Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238, 28 Am. St. 370, 14 L.R.A.85. Koeroer v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40, 68 L.R.A. 956, is also important and contains an exhaustive collection of the authorities. Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822, 21 Am. St. 249, 9 L.R.A. 514, must also be considered, though it may be thought to be affected by the later case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 79, 60, N. E. 674, 1080. The telegraph cases and the case at bar are thought by the Oklahoma court to stand upon the same footing. The Wisconsin court, however, has distinguished them. F. R. M. EMINENT DOMAIN. (Condemning Right of Way Through Cemetery.) Tenn. — In Memphis State Line R. Co. v. Forest Hill Cemetery Co., 94 Southwestern 69, a railroad sought to condemn a right of way through lands belonging to a ceme tery. The right was denied, and Wilkes and Shields, JJ., in a separate opinion, express them selves in language of no little vigor: " In our view real estate in Tennessee, conveyed for cemetery purposes forever, whether to a public or private corporation, or to a board of trustees, to have perpetual succession, is ipso facto as a matter of law dedicated to a public use of a sacred char acter. . . . We do not believe that any legisla ture of the state will ever undertake to authorize such invasion, and the condemnation of such property. . . . No emergency or contingency or necessity can justify the invasion of the resting places of the dead." And in conclusion the judges state that they are of opinion that the law and the spirit of our government and civilization, as well as the dictates of sound public sentiments, demand that cemeteries shall never be invaded for railroad or other secular purposes. " The wheels of commerce must stop at the grave." LIBEL. (Publication by Corporation — Liabil ity of Managing Editor.) U. S. C. C. A. — The lia bility of the editor-in-chief of a newspaper, having general supervision of the matter published, for the publication of a libel, though he has no actual knowledge thereof, is considered in Folwell v. Miller, 145 Fed. 495, and the editor is held free from liability. The facts in the case showed that the libel was published in a newspaper of which defendant was the editor-in-chief, but that the publication was caused by a subordinate during the absence of the editor-in-chief, and that he had no knowledge of the publication until there
