TEACHING OF EVIDENCE
677
HOW SHOULD EVIDENCE BE TAUGHT? BY CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE A CASE-BOOK for class use is, as a rule, of interest merely from the stand point of pedagogics. Designed to assist the compiler, such a book becomes, almost of necessity, a reflection of what he deems important. The work of compilation thus is essentially one of selection, and no two persons would probably make precisely the same choice in a mass of conflicting material. That the particular case-book under con sideration has interest usually denied to books of its class, is the impelling reason for a somewhat more extended examination than is generally accorded. In the present state of the law of evidence, much that is, as a rule, true of case-books is especially applicable to one on that subject. In no branch of the law would the work of selection be more largely deter mined by the author's particular view-point or that selection be more important in the results to be reached in the mind of the student. As an incident in legal pedagogics, there fore, Dean Wigmore's recent selection of "Cases on Evidence" (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1906) possesses for these and similar reasons a unique interest, and sug gests almost inevitably certain general con siderations relating to the most advanta geous method of teaching this fundamental subject. Primarily designed for Dean Wigmore's own class work, it may fairly be regarded as, in a measure, amplification, for purposes of practical instruction, of the compiler's very distinguished treatise on "Evidence," the arrangement, terminology, and general scope of which it closely follows. The case-book, indeed, conspicuously displays the same splendid industry and philosophical fullness of critical analysis which marks the general work, and will assist to bring the earlier work within the somewhat arbitrary re
quirements of the law school class room. It is admirably adapted for such a purpose. The condensation of fact is happily done — leaving much of the dramatic interest of the special facts which meant, at the time, so much to the immediate actors. A valuable help to memory as well as a strong element to attract the attention is thus preserved. If evidence can best be taught by the ex amination and comparative study of cases, it is difficult to see how the work of instruc tion could be better fostered. The doubt implied in this hypothetical statement is suggested by the peculiar rela tion which "Evidence" sustains to instruc tion by cases — study. The growth of other branches in the law, so far as they readily occur to one, is from the simple to the complex. To study the germ principle, the root thought, or conception as it works itself out in the practical affairs of litiga tion, is, therefore, most helpful. Nothing could well take its place; not alone by reason of the gain in mental discipline; but still more largely because such a diagnosis of present situation is, as the medical men would say, the only safe basis on which to cast a prognosis respecting future condi tions. The increasing complexity in rela tions with which the substantive law is called upon to deal affords a satisfactory guarantee for belief in the permanence of the system of case study. It must and will long continue, in other branches of the law, to vindicate the wisdom of its authors and the admiration of its friends. "Evidence" is, however, unique; among other things, is this — that its future de velopment must be in the opposite direc tion, i.e., from the complex to the simple. To a certain extent this has for some time been the trend of its development, in obedi ence to the obvious necessity — unless, in deed, the wheels of judicial administration
