DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT In other words, a treaty is only valid when it operates within its legitimately prescribed constitutional scope. When any question of power is raised, we have only to examine the Constitution in that particular to see whether there is any provision that is expressly, or by fair impli cation, inconsistent with the exercise of that power. A treaty and a federal law are equal in degree. The last expression, whether of treaty or law, if consistent with the prior law or treaty, governs. They are alike subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. Otherwise treaties could amend or repeal the Constitution. Tested by this standard you cannot amend or repeal tariff schedules by a treaty. It would emasculate two provisions of the Constitution. First, the first and greatest legislative power conferred upon the House of Representatives. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.1' It is conceded that a bill lowering or raising a tariff schedule is a "bill for raising revenue." The exclusive right to originate these bills is conferred upon the House. The President and the Senate cannot originate revenue measures either directly or indirectly without depriving the House of Representatives of this exclusive right, expressly conferred to originate "all bills for raising revenue." That the meas ure is termed in one instance a "bill" and in the other a "treaty" is immaterial, as they^both involve "raising revenue," are equally the supreme law when enacted, and are, therefore, in legal essence identical. Second. Such a treaty would be in direct violation of Article I, section 8, "The Congress shall have power, — To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." ) It is not open to argument that the power to levy and collect taxes, duties, and imposts is vested in "the Congress." Is it conceivable that the same instrument would at the same time vest the same power in the President, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," and place it within
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the power of the President, thus aided, to absolutely emasculate the Congress of a power that was believed to be the most vital and important conferred upon it, and make that provi sign of the Constitution a mere "sounding brass and tinkling cymbal." It was always insisted in the Constitutional Convention that the people, through the House, should exercise this great power. Mr. Gerry said "it was a maxim, that the people ought to hold the purse strings." (Journal of Con. Convention. Madison. Scott, ist Ed., p. 158.) Dr. Franklin thought "that it was always of importance that the people should know who had dis posed of their money and how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim, that those who feel can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people. " (Id. 306.) Gerry insisted again that "it was of great consequence. It was the corner-stone of the accommodation" (id. 348), and after a dis cussion of the treaty-making clause, Col. Mason declared that it was a part of the compromise, and as to the Senate, said: "The purse strings should never be put into its hands." (Id. 481.) Mr. Randolph "re garded this point as of such consequence, that, as he valued the peace of this country he would press the adoption of it." (IdSi8.) Enough has been quoted to show that if the President and the Senate can originate and pass revenue measures and thus eliminate the House of Representatives, the builders of the Constitution unwittingly destroyed what they believed to be its chief corner stone, which they had fashioned with extraordinary care. That is an unwarranted impeachment of their intelligence. The possible consequences of the doctrine em phatically negative it. An act of Congress requires the concur rence of the House and Senate and the approval, direct or indirect, of the President. A treaty is an international contract requir
