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THE GREEN BAG
on the premises. They were subsequently totally destroyed by fire before delivery of the deeds. The court held that while the loss fell on the grantor so far as the general property right was concerned, the valued policy law was applicable to insured's special right of property in the realty and allowed full recovery therefor. The wording of the Washington valued-policy law is considerably broader than is indicated above. If it provided merely that the amount written in the policy be conclusive evidence of the value of the destroyed property, then the court might well have considered the question of the assured's loss and the damages actually suffered by him, for it might well be, as was urged by the insurance company, that his loss and damage was very much less than the total value of the de stroyed property. But the statute expressly pro vides that " the amount of insurance written in such policy shall be taken conclusively to be the true value of the property when insured, and the true amount of the loss and measure of damages when destroyed." The same wording is found in the valued-policy laws of Delaware, Kansas, Nebraska and Wisconsin, and a number of other states have somewhat similar provisions. Under laws so worded the court's conclusion seems inevitable. F. T. C. MARINE INSURANCE. (Deviation from Voyage.) U. S. Dist. Ct. W. D. Wash. — On account of bad weather, a vessel passed one of its discharging ports and went to the last one where a portion of the cargo was unloaded, and returned to the intermediate port. While going back from there to the final portofdischarge, she was wrecked. The court held that this was such a deviation from the voyage that the insurers were released. — Alaska Banking & Safe Deposit Company v. Maritime Insurance Company, 136 Fed., 711. MORTGAGES. (Tender after Election to Mature Entire Debt.) Miss. — Will the tender of the installment and interest actually due under a trust deed be of any avail after the creditor has exercised his right to declare the entire debt due but before sale of the property? This question is discussed in Caldwell v. Kimbrough, 45 So. Rep., 7, and answered in the negative. The court also passes on the necessity of the creditor declaring his election at the time of default and promptly selling the property and holds that under the facts of the case the debtor was estopped to set up any claim of lack of diligence. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (Enactment of Ordinances.) N. J. — The validity of an ordinance passed by the Board of Aldermen of a
municipality was the question for determination in Paterson & Ramapo Railroad Company v. Mayor, etc., of the City of Paterson, 68 Atl. Rep., 76. By the terms of the city charter, the member ship of the Board of Aldermen, which was the governing board, changed on January first of each year, one-half of the members going out by expiration of term and newly elected members taking their places. It also provided that every ordinance must be read three times before final passage and not more than twice at any one meet ing and must be passed by a majority of all the members. It appeared that the ordinance in question was read twice and ordered to the third reading before the board organized January i, 1904, but was not finally passed by the board until after its reorganization on January i, 1904, a new election having intervened involving a change in membership. The question arose as to whether or not it was the legislative intent that the board should be continuous in character for strictly legislative purposes so that the newly organized board could take up, as in this case, an unfinished act of legislation of the preceding board and finally adopt it. The court held that the restrictive words requiring each ordinance to be read three times before final passage would not permit of such an action, but that the ordinance fell with the expiration of the board of 1983 as then organized and that its attempted enactment later by the succeeding board was invalid. PRACTICE. (New Trial.) Okla. Sup. Ct. — A novel state of affairs is shown in Butts v. Ander son, 91 Pac. Rep., 907. Plaintiff recovered judg ment in the lower court and time was given defendant to perfect an appeal, but before this was done, the court stenographer died and no one could be found to transcribe his shorthand notes. These facts were then set up in a motion for new trial which was granted by the trial court, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision; holding that none of the statutory grounds of new trial were shown and that there was nothing to indicate that the judgment for plaintiff was erroneous. PRACTICE. (New Trial.) Vt. — The Supreme Court of Vermont, in State v. Sargood, 68 Atl. Rep., 51, decided that the testimony of a wife, divorced after her husband's conviction, was not newly discovered evidence warranting the granting of a new trial. Sargood, a married man, was tried and convicted of attempting to poison certain persons. His wife was not allowed to testify on the trial. Subsequent to the con viction the wife secured a divorce, thereby becoming a competent witness for her former husband. The defense then moved for a new
