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which, however, so far as I know, legal ethics is no part). These methods have not been so long inaugurated as to show their results. The forces working for deterioration are: the elaborate Code of Civil Procedure, which substitutes an infinite number of technical rules for liberal principles of practice, begetting petty motions -in court over nonessentials of procedure; the concomitant costs which' are the perquisites of the attorney at every stage of a litigated con troversy, particularly the motion costs; the abolition of the home and the almost universal substitution of flat or apartment dwelling, with the consequent disappearance of the personal identity that accompanied home-dwelling, and the ideals that were a part of it; the ambitious and intellectual capacity of Oriental immigrants, with no apparent conception of English or Teutonic ideals; the conspicuous success of counsel for certain large aggregations of capital, the ways of whose clients have been opened to public opprobrium; and the commerciali zation of the people, substituting profit for principle. When I was first admitted to the Bar in New York it was the common practice, under the cover of a provision of statute allowing the court to tax an additional fee for extra trouble and expense, for the deputy sheriffs and their assistants to demand .exorbitant fees, without the formality of a taxation, and (it was said) without accounting for them to the sheriff; if the fees had been taxed they would have been the sheriff's perquisites, but being demanded without taxation, the sheriff had no means of knowing what had been exacted arid the deputies would almost invariably demand and receive much more than they would report to the sheriff; the difference was their graft; what they acknowledged was the sheriff's perquisite. If any one protested, he was threatened and abused, and if a lawyer, he might- know that thence forth the sheriff's minions would find ways
to vex and annoy, if not to cheat, him and his clients. That was the condition that confronted practicing lawyers, and a certain class of them knowingly took advantage of these conditions to the abuse of justice. Fortunately, conditions are better now; the sheriff's office is a salaried one; his deputies have salaries; theoretically at least they must keep an accurate report of their receipts, which belong to the state; their fees are fixed and they are liable to severe penalties for extortion. Probably such a condition as formerly existed would now be openly condemned by the Bar Association. However that may be, the change was brought about by legislation at Albany, not by any local or professional clamor. It was the result of an investiga tion in which it appeared that one prominent, firm of attorneys paid very large annual sums under the guise of such extra compen sation to the sheriff's office, and it was commonly reported that legal process was held up in the sheriff's office and the hour of its receipt falsified in order to give certain attorneys a chance to lodge prior process after being secretly notified from the sheriff's office. They were never disciplined. The successful notoriety of a particular firm whose surviving member was recently in prison for his practices, was for many years of national cognizance. It was as well known twenty years ago as it is to-day but the Bar and the judiciary never during that time took any steps against it. It took the present District Attorney of New York City, by criminal proceedings, to put the firm out of business. These, then, are, or very recently were, existing conditions. They are not universal but are sufficiently widespread to be typical and characteristic, rather than rare and so exceptional as to be unworthy of notice. It is for such conditions that a code of ethics is essential; it will be readily seen that such a code of ethics must be universal in its operation, rather than specific; for it would be perfectly easy for the unmoral
