NOTES OF RECENT CASES
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NOTES OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RECENT CASES COMPILED BY THE EDITORS OF THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM AND ANNOTATED BY SPECIALISTS IN THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS (Copies of the pamphlet Reporters containing fall reports of any of thai* decisions may be secured from the W«it Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 95 cent! each. ID ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well ae the citation of volume and pace of the Reporter in which it it printed.)
ALIENS. (Naturalization.) U. S. Dist. Ct. — By Act Congress, June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 419], it was provided that an alien may file a petition to be naturalized, not less than two years nor more than seven years after declaration of intention. The petitioner in the case of In re Wehrli, 157 Fed. Rep. 938, had filed declaration of intention to become a citizen in 1898, but failed to complete the proceedings necessary to naturalization until after the passage of the statute above referred to. It was then claimed that his right was barred, but the court held that the statute was in the nature of one of limitation; that it should not be given a retrospective effect, and that persons having filed declaration of intention previous to its enactment would not be barred from comple tion of the naturalization proceeding until seven years after its passage. ANIMALS. (Injuries from Ferocious Beast.) H. Y. Ct. of App. — Plaintiff, in the case of Molloy v. Starin, 83 N. E. Rep. 588, sued defendant, who was a common carrier, for injuries received from a wild bear in one of defendant's freight houses. It was shown that several bears were shipped on one of defendant's steamboats, and that at the dock, plaintiff, a boy nine years old, out of a spirit of curiosity, went into one of the freight houses, where the animals were confined in cages and, coming too near one of them was seized by the foot and injured. Recovery was had in the trial court, and the decision affirmed by the Appellate Division, but the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and held that the carrier was under obligation to receive the animals for transportation, and no negligence on its part was shown warranting recovery. In this case the principal point, aside from negligence and contributory negligence, was the question whether a common carrier which transports trained bears and allows them to remain in its warehouse for a few hours while their owner goes out to hire a truckman, thereby becomes the harborer or keeper of wild animals so as to make
him an insurer, and absolutely liable for any damage done by them. It is to be noted that the owner accompanied the bears during the transpor tation and looked after them and left them only for a short time after their arrival. The case was vigorously contested by able counsel on both sides, but neither one could cite a decision precisely on this point. It seems to be assumed that a bear is a wild and dangerous animal within the rule, even though he be a trained or performing bear. And the majority opinion holds that the common carrier in this instance was not their keeper within the rule. The trial court instructed the • jury that the carrier could not refuse to take property for trans portation simply because of its dangerous character. But that point is not determined upon this appeal, the majority of the court holding merely that the carrier was certainly warranted in taking this dangerous kind of property for transportation, and did not thereby become its owner or keeper within the rule of absolute liability. F. T.C. BANKRUPTCY. (Preference by Bankrupt Stock broker.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — The bankruptcy of a stock broker and the rights and liabilities arising therefrom command the attention of the United States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Shaw, a8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512. The bankrupt had pledged stocks of his customers, and within four months of the adjudication and while insolvent had redeemed certain of them and turned them over to the customer for whom they were purchased. The trustee in bankruptcy brought action for their recovery on the ground that the transaction con stituted a preference in violation of the Bank ruptcy Act. The claim was made that as the broker was under no obligation to deliver partic ular certificates to the customer the relation of debtor and creditor rather than that of pledger or pledgee existed at the time of insolvency. The court held that while the broker might not be tech nically a common law pledgee yet such was the real and essential character of the relation and as
