Latest Important Cases Common Carriers. Duty to Carry Passenger without Delay to Destination- Valid Excuse for Delay May be Set Up by Act of God or Vis Major. N. Y. Liability for delay in transporting a passenger to his destination was considered by the New York Court of Appeals in Car mack v. N. Y., N. H.& H. R. Co., decided Mar. 23 (reported N. Y. Law jour. Dec. 21). The appellant had taken a train from Quincy, Mass, to Boston, his car being stalled by a blizzard so that it could not approach to less than about six or seven hundred feet of the terminal station, appellant being com pelled to remain in the car for nine hours, on account of which he claimed $2,000 damages for the detention and his suflerings. The Court (Willard Bartlett, J.) said in part:—
“Even in respect to goods, a common carrier is not an insurer as to time. While he is responsible for the safety and final delivery thereof, and nothing can exonerate him from that responsibility but the act of God or the public enemy, he is responsible only for the exercise of due diligence in regard to the time of delivery (Parsons v. Hardy, l4 Wend. 215). So in respect to passengers, a common carrier is not an insurer as to the time when passengers will reach their destina tion, in the absence of an express contract
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Copyright. Dramatizations of Novels whose Copyrights Ha've Expired—No Unfair Com petition in Use of Some Title for Rival Plays, It being also the Title of the Novel. U. S. A novel entitled “St. Elmo," written by Augusta J. Evans, formerly had a large sale in the Southern states. The copyright was taken out in 1866 and expired in 1908. About a year before its expiration a dramatization of the book was copyrighted under the same title, "St. Elmo." After the copyright on the novel had expired a rival dramatization appeared under an identical name, and the owners of the first dramatization sued the proprietors of the second play for infringement of their own copyright. Glaser and Holcomb v. St. Elmo Co., N. Y. Law jour. Dec. 31. Judge Holt, giving judgment in December in the United States Circuit Court for the southern district of New York, dealt with two of the phases case, first the question
whether the production of the second play was an infringement of copyright, second that whether the complainants had an exclusive right to the use of the title "St Elmo" as a distinguishing trade-mark. The ruling in the former question is less interesting than that on the latter. As regards the rights of the producers of the rival play, the Court held that there was nothing to indicate that the second play had been copied after or been imitated from the first or that the first
on the subject (Gordon v. Railroad, 52 N. H.
play had been used in its construction, and
596, 599, and cases therein cited).
there was no infringement. On the question of unfair competition by use of the same title for the rival play: “I think that the authorities, particularly the American cases, preponderate that the copyright of a book does not prevent other persons from taking the same title for another book, even in the case of an entirely unex pired copyright. . . . Still, other authorities take the view that the author or proprietor of a book has a right to exclude others from adopting the same title for another book on the ground that it constitutes a trade-mark or that its use by another constitutes unfair competition in trade. . . . But I doubt whether this doctrine applies in the case of plays made from novels the copyright of which has ex— pired. Suppose that two plays were written, based on an old novel, for instance ‘Don Quixote’ or ‘Clarissa Harlow’ or ‘Quentin Durward,’ and that both such plays were given the title of the story from which they were taken. Would not the author of each
If a rail
road company negligently fails to keep the time it promises it will be liable in damages for injury thereby accruing to a passenger. ‘But to entitle the plaintiff to recover there must be proof of negligence. Neither time table nor advertisement is a warranty of punctuality.’ (Wharton on Negligence, sec. 662.) A railroad company which receives a person upon a train as a passenger to a specified destination is bound to carry the person to that destination with all reasonable diligence (Weed v. Panama R. R., 17 N. Y.
362). . . . It is the duty of the carrier to exer cise reasonable foresight in the anticipation of obstructions to travel, to use all available means for the removal of such obstructions,
and to proceed with the transportation as soon as practicable after such removal (Bow man v.
Teall, 23 Wend. 306).
Where all
this has been done the intervention of an act of God or vis major exonerates the carrier from legal liability for the delay."
