The Classification of Law
571
the law concerning Actions and Pro
Right of Private Property, were re
cedure as a distinct division of law, this raises a question, or a series of questions, of English and American law. The questions can be solved by under
garded as Things and, as Dr. Hammond
standing just what Hale, Wood and Blackstone did, and the reasons for
their doing it. Blackstone explains: "Rights of Persons are those [firstly] which concern and are annexed to the persons of men; secondly, Rights of Things are such as a man may acquire over external objects or things uncon
nected with the person."" It might have been clearer to have said: Rights of Persons are such rights as have no object unconnected with
the person; but the proximity of the two makes the contrast apparent. Blackstone uses the word “of" in the sense of concerning or relating to.
so clearly says :— If our belief, as to Blackstone's true mean
ing and method, be the correct one, he could finally have informed Mr. Austin, that what he proposed to do in the Commentaries was to transfer“ to the Law of Persons, or to locate in their proper place among the Rights of Persons, all such rights (and duties) as belonged to all persons alike, except such as had for their object "external things uncon
nected with the person." . . . This last is in truth the cardinal point of the whole matter. Blackstone adopts as his definition of a “thing,” one quite different from that employed by the classical jurists; and all the departure from civilian precedent that can fairly be charged to him, depends on, and is to be explained by this changed sense, in which he used the word “thing."“
Under the Roman Law all objects of rights, tangible or intangible, recog nized and protected by law, were treated as Things. Hale and Blackstone differ entiated these and transferred from the Law of Things to the Law of Persons
English'_Law comprehends under the term “Property" and "Things" only such objects of right as are embraced under the terms “Real Estate," “Chat tels” and "Chases." When proceeding from tangible things like land and chattels in the direction toward intangible things the word “chose” is reached, defined and limited, we have bounded the objects included
all such rights “as do immediately
within the words “Things" or “Property”
concern the persons themselves, other
in English and American Law, but we
than such rights as have external objects,
have by no means included all of the rights of action recognized by English
He does not predicate possession of all rights.
thus bringing in the topics Personal Liberty, Personal Security and Right
of Private Property as abstract personal
and American Law. A chose in action is a right to receive or recover a debt,
rights; and leaving under the Rights of Things only interests in goods and estates and obligations, because these
contract or for a tort connected with a
are in their nature separate and distinct from the persons according to the idiom used by Hale and Blackstone.
erty.“5 Of course, all are familiar with the existence of causes of action purely
According to the Roman conception,
personal which do not survive, are not
or money, or damage for a breach of contract or connected with chattel prop
what were treated by Blackstone as among the other Rights of Persons, viz. the abstract right of Personal Liberty,
Personal
Security and the abstract
I"1 Blk. Corn. 122.
“a From the Law of Things. ‘4 Sandars' Justinian, Introduction, pp. lv, lvi. ‘5 Blackstone's conception was even narrower than this, for he seems to include only damages re coverable for the breach of a contract express or implied.
