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154 Husband and Wife.

The Green Bag Wije's Right of Action

for Husband's Assault —- Common Law Rule not Modified by District of Columbia Statute. D. C. The question in Thompson v. Thompson (218 U. S. 611, 54 L. ed. 1180), decided by the United States Supreme Court Dec. 12, was whether, under the statutes governing the District of Columbia, a wife may bring an action to recover damages for an assault and battery committed by her husband. A provision of the District of Columbia Code, sec. 1155, authorizes married

women "to sue separately for the recovery, security, or protection of their property, and for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried." The court held that this provision did not so far modify the common law relation between husband and wife as to give the wife a right of action for assault. Mr. Justice Day, who wrote the opinion, said: "We can but regard this case as

another of many attempts which have failed, to obtain by construction radical and far-reaching changes in the policy of the common law, not declared in the terms of the legislation under consideration." Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Hughes concurring in this dissent. Interstate Commerce. Liability of Initial Carrier — Cormack Amendment Constitutional — Fifth Amendment — Principal and Agent. U. S. The so-called Carmack amendment to the Hepburn rate law, making the initial carrier liable for loss of interstate shipments during transportation not only on its lines, but also on those of connecting lines, was declared to be constitutional on Jan. 3 by the Supreme Court of the United States. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 31 Sup. Ct. 164. It was contended that the act, by imposing the liability on the initial carrier, in disregard of the condition in the bill of lading, denied such carrier the liberty of contract secured by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. This contention the court answered by saying that under the decisions of the Supreme Court there is no such thing as absolute freedom of contract; the power of government extends to the denial of liberty of contract to the extent of forbidding or regulating every contract which is reason ably calculated to affect injuriously the public interests. It was also contended that the act violates the Fifth Amendment by taking the property of the initial carrier to pay the debt of the inde pendent connecting carrier whose negligence may

have been the sole cause of the loss. This con tention the court held resulted from a super ficial reading of the act. To quote Mr. Justice Lurton: "The receiving carrier is. as principal, liable not only for its own negligence, but for that of any agency it may use, although, as ing between the themselves, loss may betheprimarily company liable." actually caus~ (Dis cussed in 72 Central Law Journal 129, Feb. 24.)

Interstate Commerce. Not Burdened by StateExcise Tax on Company Whose Place ofBusi ness within the State is not

Commerce.

Used in Interstate

Mass.

The plaintiff in an action brought to have a state excise tax abated as in violation of the federal Constitution, argued that chapter 490 of posing the anActs exciseof tax 1909 on foreign of Massachusetts. corporations, was im‘ invalid as putting a burden upon interstate com merce. Baltic Mining Co. v. Stevens. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in deciding against the plaintiff on Jan. 5, said: — "The plaintifi's regular place of business in Boston is not used in interstate commerce, as are the passenger stations and freight houses of railroad companies. It is used as a home in Massachusetts for this foreign corporation, for the financial management and direction of the company's affairs. where the president and treasurer have their oflices, and the meetings of the board of directors are held. It could be given up or removed to any other state without affecting in any way the plaintiff's income from interstate commerce. "If there were an arbitrary exclusion of the plaintiff from the commonwealth, except so far as it conducted the business of interstate com merce within the state it would put no burden upon its commerce, either in Massachusetts or elsewhere. Whatever view be taken of this imposition of an excise tax, it is diflicult to see how it has any direct relation to the petitioner's income from interstate commerce. The required payment is strictly of an excise tax, and not of a tax upon property." Master and Servant. Repeal of Fellow Ser vant Rule — Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutes —Egual Protection of Laws. U. S. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missis sippi Dec. 19, in a case involving the constitu tionality of the Mississippi statute abrogating the "fellow servant" rule. Mobile, Jackson 8’ Kansas City R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed. The action, which was one of tort, had been brought for the wrongful killing of a foreman of a section crew