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The Green Bag

invigorated as to one-third of its mem bers every two years, so that the tide of

public sentiment was always flowing through its deliberations. But if the identity of the states is not preserved in the Senate, all state sovereignty becomes a mere name and the legislative

powers, we repeat, now concentrated in two, will gradually melt into one

popularly chosen assembly. If the American lawyers cannot appreciate where this condition will lead, I am

sadly mistaken in their knowledge. The French Revolution offers interest ing study in this connection.

But one

many states the people already dictate to the Legislature their choice of Senators, and that as a matter of com mon practice the Legislature would not

venture to disobey the directions of the people in this respect. Unhappily for our country the postulate is true,

but I do not admit the conclusion. The Constitution is still preserved and the choice is actually sanctioned by the Legislatures, no matter at whose dic tation they act. In some instances, not necessary to be discussed, it is

quite obvious that a Legislature would be fully justified in disobeying the

thing is sure,‘ that centralization and

commands of the people.

state sovereignty cannot exist together;

But the real answer to this suggestion is that it is an experiment outside of the

they are incompatible. Where will the small states be; what will be their position under such circumstances? As it is provided “that no state with

Constitution which may, and I believe, will be quickly abandoned, for when the

out its consent shall be deprived of its equal sufirage in the Senate,” there is a very grave moral question whether any

people exercise full intelligence and dis crimination in selecting their legislators they will not wish, nor will it be necessary for them to dictate the names of the

part of the clause in question should be

Senators.

altered without the unanimous consent of all the states, for if the effect of the

faithfully represent their constituents in the selection of Senators, when the

election of Senators by popular vote be to destroy or decimate the sovereignty of the states in the Senate or to diminish their full and intended influence therein as states, then how can this suggested change be made without the consent of

all of the states? I place this proposition not on any technical ground, but upon good faith between all of the states of the Union. If altered, it was the opinion

of Senator Hoar, one of the best lawyers who ever graced the Senate, that it would absolve the larger states from the

Constitutional obligation which secures the

equal

constituents

exercise

care

and

dis

crimination in choosing the legislators.

If the change in the method of choosing Senators be adopted and this important attribute of state legislative power be taken from the members, where will it end? It will inevitably be followed by a change in the method of choosing the executive and the judiciary! And then will follow the crowning step of all — the people will dictate the particular laws which the state legislators shall make (they are already doing this in at least one western state); confusion and chaos will follow

the

the destitution of the legislators of all

I am bound to

discretion and judgment, and then ochlocracy. To avoid this, educate the

representation

states in the Senate.

The Legislatures will always

of

all

admit that I do not clearly follow this

view, but others may understand the argument better than I do.

It is said over and over again that in

people, bring to their direct attention all political questions, give them time to study and understand them.

BUT,