367
Index to Periodicals would everywhere be regarded as a violation of fundamental privilege.‘ Suretyship. See Negotiable Instruments.
Labor, and University, Policy and Of these
Taxation. See Federal and State Powers. Tichborne Case. “The Tichborne Case." By William J. Kinsley. 20 Yale Law Journal
law writers, criticize the legal grounds of the
563 (May).
A general review of this litigation written primarily to indicate the unequaled duration of the roceedings. The famous Russell will case in R'Iassachusetts "is probably the nearest approach that the new world has ever had in any case, in importance and length of hearing,
to the famous Trchborne case of England, but the Tiehbome case does not ‘sink into insignificance when com red with the Russell case.’ In fact, in Englan and in this country no other case has ever equalled in interest and amount involved the famous Tiehborne identity case." Torrens System. "The Report of the Land Transfer Commissioners." By Arthur Under hill. 27 Law Quarterly Review 173 (Apr.). Sympathetically commenting upon the Com
missioner's recommendations. Trademarks. "The Transfer of Trademarks and Trade Names." By Wallace R. Lane. HAs a general proposition, trademarks con stitute a part of the assets of an individual, firm or corporation, and title thereto may be conveyed by the same bill of sale which conveys the title
to the business and good will. We may conclude, therefore, that the title to a technical trademark
may be passed in a number of ways; also that the transfer may be made by means of various instruments or conveyances, namely: assign ment, deed, license, bill of sale, and under
bankruptcy orders; by separate conveyance or in the same conveyance with the business and good will in connection with which it is used;
by specific mention or as an incident of or appurtenant to a business and good will in connection with which it is used." Trust Funds. See Banking Law. Uniformity of Laws. See Marriage and Divorce, Negotiable Instruments. Warranty. See Insurance. workmen's Compensation. Symposium of Opinions onjDecision of New York Court of Appeals. Survey v. ‘26, pp. 185-496 (April 29). The decision is reviewed by the following writers: Henry R. Seager, Professor of Eco nomics, Columbia University; Ferd C. Schwedt man of National Association of Manufacturers; Miles M. Dawson of New York; Raynal C.
Bolling, assistant general solicitor of the United States Steel Corporation; Louis Marshall of New York, of counsel for appellant in the Ives case; Professor Frank I. Goodnow of Columbia University; Bernard Flexner of Louisville; Louis M. Greeley of Chicago; Morris Hillquit of lNew
York;
P.
Tecumseh
decision, namely Professors Freund and Good now, and Messrs. Flexner, Greeley, Hillquit and Sherman. Some of these views are expressed with considerable ability. Mr. Sherman, for example, finds the ruling on due process of law cate orically opposed to the doctrine laid down by t e United States Su reme Court in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. 78, 101, and in Hur tados v. California, 110 U. S., 516, 529.
Professor Seager finds the decision unsound and proposes a constitutional amendment as the only solution. he other contributors do not find fault with the reasoning of the Court, but recognize
the soundness of the decision. Messrs. Schwedt man and Marshall think that it has furnished a starting point for subsequent decisions laying down rational principles of compensation. Mr. Dawson considers that the solution is to be found
in compulsory insurance by use of the taxing power. Mr. Bolling favors elective compen sation, and says:——
“In my 0 inion, it would have been most unfortunate or the New York compulsory com pensation act to have become the model for
similar islation throughout this that country. From theisgbeginning l have believed this
6 Illinois Law Review 46 (May).
New York,
Professor Ernst Freund of Chicago author of Police Power, Public Constitutional Rights. writers, six of them, all lawyers or
Sherman
of
former State Commissioner
of
was an undesirable piece of legislation and that it would not give a fair test to the principle of workmen's compensation. "The vice of this act lay in the fact that it allowed a choice of remedy after the accident. This would inevitably involve a continuance of the worst evils of the present system, to wit, uncertainty,
waste, and antagonism between
employer and injured employee. The uncer tainty as to whether an injured workman would bring suit or accept the terms of the act would have existed in every case. In view of the activ ity of those lawyers who exploit injured men, very many injured employees would have been led by persuasion
and
misrepresentation
to
take the gambling chance of a lawsuit or at least to demand more than was allowed under the act. The very principle is unfair because the whole theory of an irrational compensation system is a disregard of the question of fault so far as the com nsation system is concerned. . . . " large number of the lawyers who have given this matter careful attention believe that the constitutional infirmities of the New York act can be avoided and the practical objections to it overcome by such acts as that which has become law in New Jersey, or those which are roposed
in
Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin
and
llinois. Under any of these acts the election to accept or to reject compensation must be made long before any accident has happened; and both employer and employee know at all times exactly where they stand in regard to their relations in the event of accident. It is confidently believed that these acts will almost immediately and inevitably be applied in all cases. "I think . . . they may come to feel that the deci_ sion of the New York Court of Appeals is one of
