andBag current social dynamics. According The G, en
expressed; his comments on Ihering, if tantamount to an observation that he has not adequately appreciated the subtlety of psychological factors, can be accepted in the main, though over emphasizing Ihering's shortcomings. When Berolzheimer comes to the con sideration of later exponents of socio logical doctrine, such as Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, it is apparent that he withdraws his sympathy from much that is wholesome and truly constructive in their mode of procedure, even though it cannot be accepted as an adequate formulation, and that he fails to realize the full significance of the break with evolutionary idealism, in the substitu tion of a truly dynamic for a merely flexible concept of law. While treating the law as the expression of cultural forces, Berolzheimer docs not seek to explain these cultural forces in the light of natural laws. On the contrary, he would consider such an explanation fatalistic, robbing ethics of all practical significance.31 Wundt, like Berolz heimer a voluntarist, but a voluntarist of less extreme type,32 says that moral conceptions vary widely, and that ex perience shows they cannot be deter mined a priori, yet they do not depend upon mere chance — the individual will must be brought into harmony with the general racial progress. Such a position is unsympathetically characterized by Berolzheimer "a stoicism upon a racialpsychological basis."33 Exactly where Berolzheimer himself stands he does not state, but he can be described as occupy ing an intermediate position between the Hegelian dialectical theory of progress u See pp. xlii-xliii, 313-4. 368-9, 427, 434, 459. "For Wundt's voluntarism see his article "Ueber die Definition der Psychologic" in his "Philosophische Studien," v. 12, pp. 1-66. Wundt and MUnsterberg hold opposite views with regard to the psycho-physical parallelism. "Berolzheimer. pp. 433^.
to Berolzheimer, culture is not a natural but an artificial force,34 a statement in nocuous taken by itself, but which ex presses the transcendentalist position when considered in conjunction with the segregation of the active will from the world of natural cause and effect. The outcome of Berolzheimer's atti tude toward positive law and the law postulated by cultural forces is that to be expected from his inability to accept a dynamic view of law. He finds fault with the Hegelian doctrine of evolution as having no fixed points of arrest, as implying a condition of universal flux.3 The dynamic conception of evolution would establish the premises of morality and law for any given epoch, in so far as so prodigious a task may be at least partly and tentatively performed by the human intellect, and for the concept of indeterminate haphazard progress would be substituted a determinate scheme of ideal law as that best suited to the existing society. Berolzheimer cannot find refuge in that certainty which can come only from a thoroughgoing appli cation of scientific method in every field of human life and conduct. He has to choose the middle position of a law answering to the demands of current culture, and the law is really not less indeterminate than before, for though law is determined by culture, culture is itself indeterminate. Consequently Berolzheimer, when he rejoices in the passing of the theory of absolute natural law, 3,1 is not able to replace it with any thing which comes to much more than a theory of positive law. Berolzheimer's abandonment of the Hegelian dialectic, his failure to substitute a vigorous ab stract analytic similar to that of Stamm" P. xviii. « P. 231. "P. 219.