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WATERLOO. 343 WATERLOO. direction, the cavalry divisions of Milhaud, Le- febvre-Desnouettes, Kelleniiann, and (Jujot woru hurled against the Britisli right centre, but the British squares, although .sull'ering fearfully from the lrench artillery fire, which supported the cavalry, maintained their formation un- broken. The cavalry were unsupported by infantry, !ind by seven o'clock Ney was compelled to with- dravv for lack of troops. Lobau failing to check Billow on the right, the Vouiig CJiuird was sent in between five and six o'clock and there was severe fighting around Planchenoit. A little later, believing that his riglit was secure, Napoleon massed eight available battalions of the Imperial Guard, supported by artillery, for a final at- tack on Wellington's centre, then almost shat- tered. General Friant led this assault. fs the Guard advanced, D'Krlon made a vigorous and effective assault on the British right. The Guards met a heavy fire from Maitland's brigade, and were repulsed with terrific loss. The prompt support of General Halkctt and Colonel Elphin- stone protected Maitland's left and the impetu- ous charge of Colonel Colborne with the Fifty- second Regiment completed the disorder of the Guard. The Prussians began to arrive about 7:30. Ziethen first came up from Ohain and his troops at once went into action, throwing the for the student of military science. Napoleon did not show his usual care and thorouglmess in his orders, nor his usual comprehensive judg- ment in the execution of his plan. Ney and (irouchy both failed in their judgment at critical moments. It was unfortunate for Napoleon that he had as chief of stalf a veteran oHieer who was accustomed to independent command instead of a young(^r man thorougldy trained in the de- tails of staff work. Wellington, with a less ellicient army, showed himself throughout careful, alert, and resourceful, and he was well sujiported by . his division commanders at critical moments. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it was the timely coiiiieration of the Prussians, and especial- ly the arrival in the evening of Ziethen's corps, that turned the scales finally against the French and gave a positive result to the splendid de- fense of the British position. Wellington counted on this in planning the engagement. That the junction of the Allies took place so successfully was dvie to the masterly strategy of Gneisenau, and to the absence of Grouchy on the chase to Wavre, where it was impossible for bim to ar- rive in time. Had be, instead of following his orders literally, crossed the Dyle at Moustier wnen he learned at Walhain that the battle was on, be might have headed off the Prussians and . OF THE THBEE ABMIE3 AT 8 P.M., JUNE 18,1815. French right into confusion. Seeing that victory was in his hands, Wellington threw his whole line forward. The French retreat speedily became a rout. There was no more thought of resistance except by detachments of the Guard and by Lobau with the Sixth Corps, who was holding back Billow and Pirch on the right. Napoleon left the field in the centre of a square of the OJuard and reached Paris on .June 21st. The exact losses of the two armies at Waterloo are undetermined. Those of the French, in killed, wounded, and missing, probablv numbered over 31.000. The official returns for the Allies give their losses as 22,428. The controverted points relating to the cani- paign of W^aterloo provide abundance of material delayed their arrival. Whether he could have done this, in the condition of the roads, is, how- ever, doubtful. The wisdom of Napoleon in detaching so large a force for a pursuit that rest- ed upon an inference which the issue proved to be mistaken is certainly open to question. When this had been done. Napoleon failed to keep Grouchy sufficiently informed of the exact situa- tion and its needs. Bibliography. The literature relating to the campaign of Waterloo is extensive, much being controversial and much unreliable. The best and most impartial critical study from all points of view is ,that of J. C. Ropes, The Campaign of M'atcrlo'o (New York. 1892). This is accom- panied by an atlas of fourteen maps. There is