Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 1.djvu/110

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Saturday
MADISON
June 2

〈The〉 mode of appointg ye Executive 〈was〉 resumed.

Mr. Wilson made the following motion, 〈to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph’s resolution.〉

“that the Executive Magistracy shall be 〈elected〉 in the following manner: 〈That〉 the States be divided into districts: 〈& that〉 the persons qualified 〈to vote in each〉 district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy. that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at and they or any of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested.”[1]

Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.

Mr. Gerry, opposed the election by the national legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another’s hands. votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson’s motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such 〈as〉 might 〈not〉 be requisite for local purposes. He 〈was〉 for waiting till people 〈should〉 feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. 〈He was〉 not clear that the people ought to act directly even in 〈the〉 choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.


  1. Revised from Journal.