P. 152, l. 1.
The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
P. 152, l. 17. This illustrates the expression, “Deceits of the Flesh.”
P. 156, l. 12. Another reading omits the μὴ: the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same: it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”
P. 158, l. 4. Major and minor Premisses of the συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν.
P. 158, l. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
P. 158, l. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott's Red Gauntlet.
P. 159, l. 23.
That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premiss: it is true, “that all that is sweet is pleasant;” it is true also, that “this is sweet:” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the major, i.e. the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus; a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided;” at a certain time his αἴσθησις tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided:” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But ἐπιθυμία, being a simple tendency towards indulgence, suggests, in place of the minor premiss “This is excess,” its own premiss “This is sweet;” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle (Ἀρχὴ), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”
The solution then of the phænomenon of ἀκρασία is this: that
ἐπιθυμία, by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, ἐπιστήμη i.e. ὀρθὸς λόγος easily defeats ἐπιθυμία. The ἀκρατὴς, an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The ἀκόλαστος would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II. Sat. 2).
Quæ virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo
.....
Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes
Verùm hìc impransi mecum disquirite.
Compare also Proverbs xxiii. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc.
