39G COUNSELS ENDING IN THE CHAP. ' the enemy will retain to the last free and oj-en conimuni- V- ' cation to the ])lace.* '4. There is eveiy reason to believe, from the api)earance ' of the map?, and what may be expected to be the forma- ' tiou of the ground, that there is a very strong position
- between the sea at BahacLiva and along the valley of the
' Tchernaya, that would most elliciently cover the Allied
- armies during the operation, Init is too extensive to be
' taken up by the garrison. '5. That the communication with the fleet, which is, in ' fact, our base of operations, would be far more secure and
- commodious by the small harbour of Balaclava and the
- bays near Chersonese, than on the open coast to the
' north, and with the advantage of a good road from Bala-
- clava to the attacks, and a very flat country to pass to
' them from the bays near Chersonese. ' G. Under ordinary circumstances such a movement ' woidd have the efiect of exposing the communication of ' the army to be cut off; but in this case the idea is, to
- abandon the communication from the north altogether,
- and establish a new one to the shipping in the .south,
' which would be nlo^■ed round for that purpose. ' J. F. BuRGOYXE, Lieut. -General.' Having completed this menioraudum. Sir John Plan of the Bui'goyne was requested by Lord liaglau to go to iiropoumk'd the Freucli Headquarters, and there propound the tHAnmud: phin of the flank march. He obeyed. His inter- view with Marshal St Arnaud took place in the presence of the jNIarshal's chi(;f of Ihe Staff and of General Bizot, the officers in command of the
- Possibly some words may have been here left out or nus-
AViitten, for, as actually worded, this last suggestion seems to be not only an error, but an inversion of the real state of the case. The attack of the North Side was the one which would have been compatible with plans for seizing the enein3s lines of communication, wlillst the flank march was on the contrary a final aljdication of all power to operate in that way.
