Page:United States Reports, Volume 545.djvu/982

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METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645–646 (CA7 2003).

One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971), and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (CA2 1963).^[1] Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S., at 434, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law, id., at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,

↑ We stated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), that “ ‘the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn’ . . . . [R]easoned analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim] necessarily entails consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed the parties … rely upon such arguments and authority in support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory infringement,” id., at 435, n. 17 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 457–458 (CD Cal. 1979)). In the present case MGM has argued a vicarious liability theory, which allows imposition of liability when the defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (CA2 1963); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (CA7 1929). Because we resolve the case based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze separately MGM’s vicarious liability theory.

[1] We stated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), that “ ‘the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn’ . . . . [R]easoned analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim] necessarily entails consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed the parties … rely upon such arguments and authority in support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory infringement,” id., at 435, n. 17 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 457–458 (CD Cal. 1979)). In the present case MGM has argued a vicarious liability theory, which allows imposition of liability when the defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (CA2 1963); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (CA7 1929). Because we resolve the case based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze separately MGM’s vicarious liability theory.

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