100 STAT. 3341-121
PUBLIC LAW 99-591—OCT. 30, 1986
asset for maintaining an adequate and credible deterrent posture; (2) such technologies and programs should be developed as rapidly as feasible in order to produce and deploy advanced systems which will complicate the military planning of the Soviet Union and as a consequence enhance the deterrent posture of the United States; (3) such technologies and programs should be funded at the levels authorized in this Act; and (4) all the funds appropriated for such programs should be fully used for such programs. (b) None of the funds appropriated in this Act to carry out the Advanced Technology Bomber Program or the Advanced Cruise Missile Program may be used for any other purpose. (c) None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used for research, development, demonstration, procurement or any other purpose related to B-IB bombers beyond the 100 such bombers previously authorized. SEC. 9113. (a) Not later than October 14, 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United States shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified versions, containing a detailed assessment, including the individual views of each of the Chiefs, of the military impacts on the national security of the United States, of the possible military responses of the Soviet Union to an American decision to no longer comply with major provisions of existing strategic offensive arms limitation agreements, including the central numerical sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles contained in the SALT II accord. This assessment shall concentrate on possible Soviet military responses during the period between fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1996, inclusive, and shall address, among other considerations, the following: (1) the impact on the ability of United States strategic forces to accomplish their nuclear deterrent mission, including the impacts on the survivability of United States strategic forces and on the ability of United States strategic forces to achieve required damage expectancies against Soviet targets, of any expansion of Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements; (2) the additional cost to the United States, above currently projected military expenditures for those periods for which such budget projections are available, of research, development, production, deployment, and annual operations and support for any additional strategic forces required to counter any expansion in Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements; (3) under average annual real growth projections in defense spending of 0 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent, the percent of the annual defense budget in each year between fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1996 which would be consumed by increased United States strategic forces needed to counter the Soviet force expansions; (4) the military impacts on United States national security of the diversion of the funds identified in subsection (a)(2) away from nonstrategic defense programs and to strategic programs
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