PUBLIC LAW 100-180—DEC. 4, 1987
101 STAT. 1137
h which, if measured on the basis of the current official method used by the United States in estimating Soviet underground nuclear test yields (taking into account the differences between the United States and Soviet test sites), would have an indicated central value exceeding 150 kilotons yield. (4) The number of tests conducted by the United States after March 31, 1976, if any, which actually had yields exceeding 150 kilotons, the estimated central value of each such test, and the - date on which each such test was conducted. (5) A description of all nuclear testing activities of the Soviet Union which the President has found to be likely violations of £ the legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the dates on which those activities took place, and the specific legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty likely to have been violated by the Soviet Union in conducting such activities. (6) A discussion of whether and, if so, the extent to which, the President, in arriving at his finding that several nuclear tests V conducted by the Soviet Union constituted a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, considered the mutual agreement contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which permits one or two minor, unintended breaches of the 150 kiloton limit per year to be considered nonviolations of the Treaty. (7) A detailed comparison of the current official method used by the United States Government in estimating Soviet undert ground nuclear test yields with the method replaced by the current method, and the date on which the current official method was adopted by the United States. SEC. 904. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
(a) CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in negotiations to conclude a treaty on intermediaterange nuclear forces (INF) and are continuing serious negotiations on other issues of vital importance to the national security of the United States. (2) The current negotiations, which reflect delicate compromises on both sides, are a culmination of years of detailed and complex negotiations in which the negotiators for the United States have been pursuing a policy consistently advor cated by the past two Presidents regarding nuclear arms control in the European theater. (3) While recognizing fully that the President, under clause 2, President of U.S. f section 2, article II of the Constitution, has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, the Congress also recognizes the special responsibility conferred by
- the Founding Fathers on the Senate in requiring that it give its
advice and consent before a treaty may be ratified by the United States and that in carrying out this responsibility the Senate is accountable to the people of the United States and has a duty to ensure that no treaty is ratified which would be detrimental to the welfare and security of the United States. (4) In recognition of this responsibility, the Senate has estab- Arms Control lished a special continuing oversight body, the Arms Control Observer Group, Observer Group, which over the last two and one-half years has establishment.