101 STAT. 1138
PUBLIC LAW 100-180—DEC. 4, 1987
functioned to provide advice and counsel to the President and his negotiators, when appropriate, on a continuing basis during the course of the negotiations to achieve an INF treaty. President of U.S. (5) The Senate and the President both have a role under the Constitution in the making of treaties and Congress as a whole
- ' has a role under the Constitution in the regulating of expenditures, including expenditures for weapons systems that may be
the subject of treaty negotiations. (b) CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS.—In light of the findings in sLibsection (a). Congress— (1) fully supports the efforts of the President to negotiate stabilizing, equitable, and verifiable arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union; (2) endorses the principle of mutuality and reciprocity in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and cautions that neither the Congress nor the President should take actions which are unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union; and (3) urges the President to take care that no provision is agreed to in those negotiations that would be harmful to the security of the United States or its allies and friends. (c) DECLARATION OF THE SENATE.—The Senate declares that it will reserve judgment regarding the approval of any arms control treaty until it has conducted a thorough examination of the provisions of the treaty and has assured itself that those provisions— (1) are effectively verifiable; and (2) serve to enhance the strength and security of the United States and its allies and friends. SEC. 905. REPORT ON MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
(a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report examining the military consequences of any arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that would provide for the elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. (b) MATTERS TO B E DISCUSSED.—Such report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form and shall include a discussion of the strategic, budgetary, and force structure implications of an agreement described in subsection (a) for— (1) conventional defenses of the United States and its allies in Europe, the Far East, and other regions vital to the national •8.1}'b: > Kisn" security of the United States; (2) tactical nuclear deterrence by the United States in those regions; (3) strategic offensive retaliatory systems of the United States that would not be affected by such an agreement, including bomber forces and cruise missiles; (4) air defenses of the United States needed to counter bomber forces and cruise missiles of the Soviet Union; (5) Strategic Defense Initiative programs designed to provide possible defenses against strategic ballistic missiles; and '. ^ (6) any new programs which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ' of Staff may consider necessary in order for the United States to ,^., protect its national security interests in light of the relative
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