102 STAT. 2004
Reports. Classified information. Public information.
PUBLIC LAW 100-456-SEPT. 29, 1988
and programs during the five years covered by the Five-Year Defense Program submitted to Congress during that year pursuant to section 114(g) of this title; "(C) reflect, in the overall assessment and in the strategic and regional assessments, the defense capabilities and programs of the armed forces of the United States specified in the budget submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31 in the year in which the report is submitted and in the five-year defense program submitted in such year; and "(D) identify the deficiencies in the defense capabilities of the armed forces of the United States in such budget and such fiveyear defense program. "(3) The Secretary shall transmit to Congress the report required for each year under paragraph (1) at the same time that the President submits the budget to Congress under section 1105 of title 31 in that year. Such report shall be transmitted in both classified and unclassified form.". gEC. 732. LINKAGE OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Final Report to the President by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the "Packard Commission"), the Defense Acquisition Study of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (referred to as "Discriminate Deterrence") have separately identified significant deficiencies in the integration of weapon acquisition programs of the Department of Defense with national military strategy. (2) There is no established process involving the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff in which strategy, policy, operational concepts, and resource constraints are fully debated, coordinated, and translated into weapon acquisition programs. The dominant role of setting requirements for new weapon systems remains with the headquarters staffs of the military departments, and the requirements developed by those departments often do not appear to have been rigorously evaluated in terms of their overall contribution to national military strategy. (3) The requirements and planning process of the Department of Defense is not constrained by realistic projections of future defense budgets. Consequently, the process is fiscally unrealistic and, therefore, largely ignored in the subsequent planning and budgeting process. This process often results in disparate plans that do not optimize the potential contribution of the acquisition programs of each military department to the objectives of national military strategy. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that— (1) to ensure that the United States develops and acquires the proper mix of weapon systems to support national military strategy most effectively and efficiently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff should better define the links between national military strategy and specific acquisition programs;
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