PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990
104 STAT. 1839
SEC. 3142. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS TO
ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
The Congress, mindful of the commitment of the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in the Limited Test Ban Treaty
of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek the
discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time
and of the commitment which shall be legally binding on the parties
upon ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground
Nuclear Weapons Tests to "continue their negotiations with a view
toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all
underground nuclear weapons tests", states that it is the sense of
Congress that the United States shares a special responsibility with
the Soviet Union to continue the bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks to
achieve further limitations on nuclear testing, including the
achievement of a verifiable comprehensive test ban.
PART D—INTERNATIONAL FISSILE MATERIAL AND WARHEAD CONTROL
SEC. 3151. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URA-
NIUM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR
STOCKPILES
(a) PRODUCTION BY THE SOVIET UNION. — Congress urges the President of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet
Union—
(1) to cease production by the Soviet Union of plutonium;
(2) to maintain the cessation in production by the Soviet
Union of highly-enriched uranium for weapons that was announced on April 7, 1989.
(b) TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF FISSILE MATERIAL MONITORING AND
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT.— Should the President determine that future international agreements should provide for dismantlement of nuclear warheads and a ban on further production of
fissile materials for weapons, then the Congress urges the President
to seek to establish with the Soviet Union a joint technical working
group to examine and demonstrate cooperative technical monitoring
and inspection arrangements that could be applied to the design and
verification of these potential provisions.
(c) REPORT ON VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES.— (1) The President shall President.
prepare a comprehensive technical report on the verification matters described in paragraph (2).
(2) The report shall describe the on-site monitoring techniques,
inspection arrangements, and national technical means that could
be used by the United States to verify the actions of other nations
with respect to the following:
(A) Dismantlement of nuclear warheads in the event that a
future agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union should provide for such dismantlement to be carried out
in a mutually verifiable manner.
(B) A mutual United States-Soviet ban, leading to a multilateral, global ban, on the production of additional quantities of
plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.
(C) The end use or ultimate disposal of any plutonium and
highly enriched uranium recovered from the dismantlement of
nuclear warheads.
(3) In order to prepare the report required by paragraph (1), the
President shall establish a Technical Advisory Committee on Ver-
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