Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 104 Part 3.djvu/487

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PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990 104 STAT. 1839 SEC. 3142. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN The Congress, mindful of the commitment of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and of the commitment which shall be legally binding on the parties upon ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests to "continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests", states that it is the sense of Congress that the United States shares a special responsibility with the Soviet Union to continue the bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks to achieve further limitations on nuclear testing, including the achievement of a verifiable comprehensive test ban. PART D—INTERNATIONAL FISSILE MATERIAL AND WARHEAD CONTROL SEC. 3151. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URA- NIUM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILES (a) PRODUCTION BY THE SOVIET UNION. — Congress urges the President of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union— (1) to cease production by the Soviet Union of plutonium; (2) to maintain the cessation in production by the Soviet Union of highly-enriched uranium for weapons that was announced on April 7, 1989. (b) TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF FISSILE MATERIAL MONITORING AND NUCLEAR WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT.— Should the President determine that future international agreements should provide for dismantlement of nuclear warheads and a ban on further production of fissile materials for weapons, then the Congress urges the President to seek to establish with the Soviet Union a joint technical working group to examine and demonstrate cooperative technical monitoring and inspection arrangements that could be applied to the design and verification of these potential provisions. (c) REPORT ON VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES.— (1) The President shall President. prepare a comprehensive technical report on the verification matters described in paragraph (2). (2) The report shall describe the on-site monitoring techniques, inspection arrangements, and national technical means that could be used by the United States to verify the actions of other nations with respect to the following: (A) Dismantlement of nuclear warheads in the event that a future agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union should provide for such dismantlement to be carried out in a mutually verifiable manner. (B) A mutual United States-Soviet ban, leading to a multilateral, global ban, on the production of additional quantities of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. (C) The end use or ultimate disposal of any plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. (3) In order to prepare the report required by paragraph (1), the President shall establish a Technical Advisory Committee on Ver-