113 STAT. 790 PUBLIC LAW 106-65—OCT. 5, 1999 (8) The United Nations Security Council endorsed the United States-United Kingdom proposal on August 27, 1998 in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1192. (9) The United States, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions, called on Libya to ensure the production of evidence, including the presence of witnesses before the court, and to comply fully with all the requirements of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. (10) After years of intensive diplomacy. Colonel Qadhafi finally transferred the two Libyan suspects to The Netherlands on April 5, 1999, and the United Nations Security Council, in turn, suspended its sanctions against Libya that same day. (11) Libya has only fulfilled one of four conditions (the transfer of the two suspects accused in the Lockerbie bombing) set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 that would justify the lifting of United Nations Security Council sanctions against Libya. (12) Libya has not fulfilled the other three conditions (cooperation with the Lockerbie investigation and trial, renunciation of and ending support for terrorism, and payment of appropriate compensation) necessary to lift the United Nations Security Council sanctions. (13) The United Nations Secretary General issued a report to the Security Council on June 3CI, 1999, on the issue of Libya's compliance with the remaining conditions. (14) Any member of the United Nations Security Council has the right to introduce a resolution to lift the sanctions against Libya now that the United Nations Secretary General's report has been issued. (15) The United States Government considers Libya a state sponsor of terrorism and the State Department Report, "Patterns of Global Terrorism; 1998", stated that Colonel Qadhafi "continued publicly and privately to support Palestinian terrorist groups, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC". (16) United States Government sanctions (other than sanctions on food or medicine) should be maintained on Libya, and in accordance with United States law, the Secretary of State should keep Libya on the list of countries the governments of which have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 in light of Libya's ongoing support for terrorist groups. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—I t is the sense of Congress that the President should use all diplomatic means necessary, including the use of the United States veto at the United Nations Security Council, to prevent the Security Council from lifting sanctions against Libya until Libya fulfills all of the conditions set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883. SEC. 1235. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON DISENGAGING FROM NONCRITICAL OVERSEAS MISSIONS INVOLVING UNITED STATES COMBAT FORCES. (a) FINDINGS. —Congress makes the following findings: (1) It is the National Security Strategy of the United States to "deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames".
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